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Article 3

ARTICLES
SPEED, SAFETY, AND DIGNITY:
PEDIATRIC PHARMACEUTICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN AN AGE OF OPTIM[ISM

RANDALL BALDWIN CLARKt

INTRODUCTION: BRAvE NEW WORLD FORECLOSED?
The practice of medicine will shortly experience an upheaval of historic
proportions-if the therapeutic promise of recent biogenetic breakthroughs is
even partially exploited. An endless supply of easily transferable organs, it is said,
will be assured by mammalian cloners and pluripotent stem-cell cultivators. A
cure for immune-system disorders (among many others) will be offered by gene
transfers. And, as the cartographers of the human genome refine their maps,
even more therapeutic possibilities-many now unimaginable-will appear to
us. Though the enthusiasm of the American people is often derided as Panglossian, current expectations in this instance are not entirely unwarranted.
Although the benefits of contemplated discoveries will in all likelihood be
t
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enjoyed broadly, one medical sub-population--children-will be particularly
benefited, if only because the number of therapeutic tools historically available
to pediatricians has lagged far behind those available to other practitioners. To
ensure that pediatric pharmaceuticals are developed in abundance, both the legislative and the executive branches have adopted and are currently considering a
variety of research-promoting initiatives. Congress has recently committed additional funding to pediatric research and granted patent-protection extensions to
companies that undertake pediatric testing of their extant products.' For its part,
the Executive has commanded pharmaceutical companies to make pediatric
research a high priority: A recent Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") rule
and its companion National Institutes of Health ("NIH") guideline (collectively,
the "Pediatric Rule") demand that researchers include children in their research
protocols or give a compelling account for their absence. 2 Further, when administrative authority so to regulate was challenged in federal court, 3 Congress took

1.
Even as Congress has vigorously increased its commitment to funding biomedical research in
general (in 2000 it resolved to increase NIH funding for biomedical research by $2.7 billion, and in 2001 by
$3.4 billion; Biomedical Revitalization Resolution of 2001, HR Res 72, S Res 19, 107th Cong. (2001); HR
Res 437, S Res 253, 106th Cong (2000)), it has demonstrated particular concern that incentives and other,
less direct, subsidies materialize. Most significantly, Congress passed (and President Clinton signed) § 111
of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, Pub L No 105-115, 111 Stat 2296 (1997), codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 USC § 351 et seq. ("FDAMA"), which grants patent-protection
extension when the manufacturer promises to conduct pediatric studies of its product.
The two subsequent Congresses have been similarly concerned with pediatric testing issues. The 106th
Congress considered a flurry of bills seeking to remedy this inequity, see, for example, Healthy Kids 2000
Act, HR 1085, S 592, 106th Cong (1999) (proposing additional financial support for pediatric research),
and then enacted, with President Clinton's signature, the Children's Health Act of 2000, Pub L No 106310, 114 Stat 1101, 42 USC § 201 et seq. (2000).
The 107th, for its part, has passed one bill in this genre and is now considering in committee at least
three more. See Research Revitalization Act of 2002, S 3060 (Oct 4, 2002); Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub L No 107-109, 115 Stat 1408 (Jan 4, 2002) (extending for five years the FDAMA's patentextension regime); Better Medicine for Children Act, S 1301 (Aug 1, 2001); Orphan Drug Tax Credit Act
of 2001, HR 1298 (March 29, 2001).
2.
See Regulations Requiring Manufacturers to Assess the Safety and Effectiveness of New Drugs
and Biological Products in Pediatric Patients, 63 Fed Reg 66,632, at 66,633 (Dec 2, 1998) ("FDA Pediatric
Testing Initiative"); NIH Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion of Children as Participants in Research
Involving Human Subjects (March 6, 1998) ("NIH Pediatric Guidelines"). In addition, the National Human
Research Protections Advisory Committee, an advisory board within the Department of Health and Human Services, has begun urging the Food and Drug Administration to allow teenagers to enroll in studies
of experimental treatments without their parents' knowledge or permission. Mary Faith Marshall, chairperson, National Human Research Protections Advisory Committee, Comment Letter to the FDA on 45 CFR 46
Subpart D 408(c), Aug 13, 2001. See also Susan Okie, FDA Urged to Broaden Study Rules, Wash Post, July 31,
2001, at A2.
Similar initiatives, undertaken for similar reasons, have been aimed at women, minorities, and the elderly. See Memorandum for the Secretary of Health and Human Services: Increasing Participation of Medicare Beneficiaries in Clinical Trials (June 7, 2000); CDC/ATSDR Policy on the Inclusion of Women and
Racial and Ethnic Minorities in Externally Awarded Research, 60 Fed Reg 47,947 (Sept 15, 1995); NIH
Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research, 59 Fed Reg 14,508
(March 28, 1994).
3. See Ass'n ofAm. Physidansand Surgeons v FDA, 2002 WL 31323411 (D DC).
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up legislation specifically supporting this initiative.
On their face, these initiatives appear unobjectionable, with just the right
touch of political correctness to boot: Why should middle-aged white males be
the only ones to enjoy one of the great blessings of contemporary technologysafe and reliable remedies for life-threatening illness? Do not our children deserve the best possible medical care?
Difficulties emerge, however, when one considers the means by which these
therapeutic potentialities will be translated into pediatric remedies: experimentation on children.
The most obvious and important problem is the frankly and inevitably utilitarian justification for pediatric research. That pediatricians might have the ability-when the time comes-to cure the generations of children who are not yet
ill, researchers must now ask the presently sick to suffer certain discomfort and
run the risk of injury or death. The recent federal pediatric pharmaceutical development initiatives force us to ask, once again, if this calculation still comports
with our moral sensibilities: Should the health and dignity of the children who
currently suffer be sacrificed to the health of the many more who will later fall
ill?
Less obvious, less important, but more pertinent to the present-day structuring of our institutions is the challenge that the "Pediatric Rule" poses to the
federal rule that has strictly limited the nature of pediatric experimentation over
the last two decades. 5 In the 1970s, largely in response to the revelation that the
consulting physician to the Willowbrook School, an overcrowded state-run
home for the mentally disabled, had deliberately infected healthy children with
hepatitis to learn more about the disease's aetiology,6 Congress authorized the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("DHEW') to regulate experimentation on children. 7 Though the final rule ("Subpart D") does not categorically prohibit pediatric experimentation, it does present itself to the research
community as an attempt to limit the participation of children in clinical research trials. 8
In light of this long-standing limitation on pediatric experimentation, the
current federal research initiatives, innocuous as they seem, will likely present
researchers and their institutional homes with grave legal problems, especially
when corporate pharmaceutical sponsors begin to respond. Although it would

4.
See A Bill to Amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to Require Labeling Containing Information Applicable to Pediatric Patients, S 2394 (April 29, 2002); HR 4730 (May 14, 2002).
5.
See Additional Protections for Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 45 CFR §§ 46.40146.409 (2001) ("Subpart D").
6.
See generally David J. Rothman & Sheila M. Rothman, The Willowbrook Wars 257-95 (Harper
1984).
7.
See National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-348 § 202(a)(2), 88 Stat 342,
349 (1976) ("National Research Act").
8.
See Subpart D (cited in note 5).
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be easy to assume that the "Pediatric Rule" represents the Executive's repudiation of Subpart D, it does not present itself as such. The current state of the law
is, rather, that both are in force.
The impending collision between these two regimes prompts many questions. On the one hand, caregivers will want assurances that children's interests
are in fact promoted: Will pediatricians acquire useful pharmacological tools in a
timely manner? Will child subjects be safe? Will societal regard for the dignity of
children be preserved? On the other, the research community will want to discern the boundaries of the law: How far can an aggressive researcher push the
envelope? When must the institutional review board ("IRB") 9 deny authorization? What sort of protocol can government regulators cite as a violation? Finally, our legislators will want to figure out how to revise the law so as to satisfy
both groups: How can we clarify boundaries for the research community and
accommodate the speedy, safe, and dignified advance of pediatric medicine?
What follows is an attempt to discern the answer to these questions. I will
first provide a brief historical background of the issues-ethical, medical, political, and legal-that inform the current debate. The subsequent discussion (Part
II) will seek to define the contours of the regulations that have governed-and
still claim to control-pediatric research. Part III will attempt to identify with
precision the capabilities and, more strikingly, the limitations of this regime. To
conclude, I will offer recommendations to remedy several of the regime's most
vulnerable elements, as well as my observations concerning the direction that
the next round of regulatory change might take.

I. REGULATORY WORLDS IN COLLISION

A. HISTORIC PROTECTIVE REGULATION
Since the inception of scientific medicine, the physician has had to reckon
with a fundamental conflict in his art. On the one hand, he desires to heal the
patient before him, the one who has come begging to be cured. On the other,
the same physician wishes to expand the frontier of medical knowledge, not
only to satisfy his own curiosity but also to equip himself and his fellows to address more confidently and competently the other suffering men and women
who will come asking for relief.10 The promise of the Hippocratic Oath, "I will
abstain from all... harm," has been read by many generations of doctors and
9.
To maintain eligibility for federal funding, an institution engaged in experimentation on humans must certify that all governmentally funded research protocols occurring under its aegis conform to
the applicable regulations. In deference to the long-standing tradition of professional self-regulation, these
review boards are staffed primarily by researchers from the regulated institution.
10.
See generally Clark, The Law Most Beaufifol and Best at ch 3 (cited in the biographical footnote).
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patients as an attempt to resolve this dilemma for all those who would ever take
up the staff of Asclepias: The sufferer at hand has priority over the sufferer yet
to come." As Leon Kass has summarized this ethic: "[T]he physician must pro12
duce unswervingly the virtues of loyalty and fidelity to his patient."' This suggests, very nearly, a fiduciary obligation-an obligation somewhat at odds with
the canons of scientific research.
Indeed, the development of the inductive scientific method provided the
medical fraternity with grounds for revisiting the question. Physicians learnedalong with their fellow natural scientists in other fields-that by conducting
medical interventions wherein as many variables as possible were controlled,
repeating the process in different locations at the hand of different observers,
they could systematically acquire generally applicable knowledge concerning the
nature of human diseases and their treatments. 13 The process accelerated greatly
in the late 19th century, after it was discovered that various charitable institutions founded for the benefit of the poor and their children-penitentiaries,
hospitals, schools, reformatories, orphanages, and foundling homes-proved to
be fertile fields for the spread of disease in controllable circumstances. 14 By the
end of World War II, during which both Axis and Allied powers conducted
extensive experimentation on humans, a new ethic was born: As long as the
physician obtains his patient's "voluntary informed consent," he may legitimately experiment upon him.' 5
The next two decades witnessed the development of a research imperative.
As physicians succeeded in ameliorating---even curing-a number of maladies,
public appetite for other treatments grew. In 1945, Congress apportioned
$700,000 to the NIH; in 1965 it granted $437 million.16 Out of eagerness to
satisfy this growing desire, American medical researchers had, it was learned in
the late 1960s and early '70s, conducted experiments that violated even the permissive "informed consent" standard.' 7 Most notable was the revelation that
illiterate black male syphilitics in rural Alabama had been left deliberately untreated as part of an effort, commonly referred to as the "Tuskegee Study," to
learn more about the natural course of the disease.' 8
The Oath, in Hippocrates I 300-301 (W.H.S. Jones trans, Loeb Classical 1923).
11.
12.
Leon R. Kass, Toward a More NaturalScience: Biology and Human Affairs 196 (Free Press 1985).
13.
See A. McGehee Harvey, Science at the Bedside: Clinical Research in American Medicine, 1905-1945
368-84 (Johns Hopkins 1981).
14.
See Susan E. Lederer & Michael A. Grodin, HistoricalOverview: PediatricExperimentation, in Michael A. Grodin & Leonard H. Glantz, eds, Children as Research Subjects: Science, Ethics, and Law 3, 5-7 (Oxford 1994) ("Children as Research Subjecti').
15.
See The Nuremberg Code, excerpted from "Permissible Medical Experiments," Trials of War
Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuremberg, October 1946-1949, vol 2, 181-182 (US Govt Printing Office 1949-1953). See also Ruth R. Faden & Tom L.
Beauchamp, A History and Theor ofInformed Consent 151-56 (Oxford 1984).
See Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and ClinicalResearcb, 274 New England J Med 1354, 1355 (1966).
16.
17.
See Faden & Beauchamp, Informed Consent at 161-67 (cited in note 15).
See generally James H. Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (Free Press 1993).
18.
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In the aftermath of congressional hearings on this and other instances of investigatory overreaching, the executive and legislative branches began the process of enacting regulations to protect human research subjects. The first to act
was the DHEW, which created a limited set of regulations in May 1974.19 Congress followed shortly thereafter. In July it passed the National Research Act,
which created a blue-ribbon committee, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research ("National
Commission"), to formulate guidelines for future refinement and extension of
the DHEW rule. 20 Several years later, in 1979, the National Commission released the Belmont Report: EthicalPrinciples and Guidelinesfor the Protection of Human
Subjects of Research.2' The DHEW, now rechristened as the Department of Health
and Human Services ("DHHS"), followed up with general regulations in 1981.22
At the same time, the DHHS added to this basic rule ("Subpart A") regulations
purporting to provide "additional protections" for fetuses ("Subpart B')23 and
prisoners ("Subpart C").2 4 Protections for children followed in 1983 ("Subpart
D'),25 building upon the National Commission's child-specific report of 1977.26
Many other administrative agencies followed the DHHS, each with its own set
of regulations. In 1991, however, most decided to subscribe (with minor exceptions) to the DHHS rule as amended in 1983. To date, this so-called "Common
Rule" governs (with minor variations) all research conducted, funded, or regu27
lated by sixteen different federal agencies.
B. CONSEQUENCES: BENIGN AND OTHERWISE
In retrospect it appears that these regulations have had the desired effect:
Over the past three decades, reported incidents of child abuse in the course of
biomedical investigation have been fewer and milder. It also appears, however,
that this scheme might well have played a role in retarding the pace of pharma19.
See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed Reg 18,914 (May 30,1974).
20.
See National Research Act at § 202(a)(1)(A) (cited in note 7).
21.
See National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (1979)
("Belmont Report ").
22.
See Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 CFR §§ 46101-46.124
(2001) ("Subpart A").
23.
See Additional Protections Pertaining to Research Development and Related Activities Involving Fetuses, Pregnant Women, and Human In Vitro Fertilization, 45 CFR §§ 46.201-46.211 (2001) ("Subpart B").
24.
See Additional Protections Pertaining to Biomedical and Behavioral Research Involving Prisoners as Subjects, 45 CFR §§46.301-46.306 (2001) ("Subpart C').
25.
See Subpart D (cited in note 5).
26.
See National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, Report and Recommendations: Research Involing Children (1977) (DHEW Publication No. (OS)770004) ("Research Involving Children").
27.
See United States Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects-Notices and Rules, 45
CFR § 46, 56 Fed Reg 28,003 UJune 18, 1991) ("Common Rule").
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ceutical development for children, especially infants and fetuses. 28
To see how this occurred, it is necessary to understand the basic dynamics
of the pediatric pharmaceutical market. 29 Developing drugs is very costly. In
addition to the expenses normally associated with any manufacturing process, a
pharmaceutical company must run a potential product through three separate
clinical trials before it can be marketed for public consumption: one for toxicity,
the next for effectiveness, and the third for dosage. The costs of such careful
testing are not trivial. At the very least, the company must make payments to the
researchers, hospitals, referring doctors, and (often enough) subjects.
In light of these expenses, the company must ask itself an important question about any potential product: Will we enjoy, over the drug's period of market exclusivity, revenues that sufficiently exceed its costs? This question is often
answered in the negative with regard to the pediatric market. The revenue side is
generally small: Children are few in number, 30 generally healthy, and not as
prone to chronic illness as, say, the elderly. 31 The cost side is quite large: In addi-

28.
See Charles J. Cot6 et al, Is the "Therapeutic Orphan" about to be Adopted?, 98 Pediatrics 118, 11820 (1996); Committee on Drugs, American Academy of Pediatrics, Guidelinesforthe EthicalConduct of Studies
to Eialuate Drugs in PediatricPopulations, 95 Pediatrics 286 (1995). Even if Cot6 and the AAP's findings of
causation are mistaken, it is beyond argument that development and labeling for pediatric pharmaceuticals
have declined over the past quarter century. This can be seen in data available from the early 1990s. In
1991 seventeen new molecular entities with potential for both adult and pediatric application were submitted to the FDA for approval. In spite of the fact that each of these drugs had the potential to benefit
children, for only nine of them (56%) did the developers submit information concerning dosage for children. The situation goes downhill from there. In 1996 only 37% carried such information; in 1997 the
figure was 33%, see FDA Pediatric Testing Initiative at 66,633 (cited in note 2). A similar picture can also
be seen from a different angle. In 1973 the Physician's Desk Refermee showed that, of all the medications
2 20
had the information necessary for appropriate pediatric usage. By 1991 the
included therein, only
figure had declined to 19%. Committee on Drugs (cited in this note).
This lack of information regarding the pediatric use of pharmaceuticals of general utility is even more
pronounced when one takes a careful look at the quality of the labeling information provided for the drugs
that comprise that 19%. While labeling for some classes of drugs does declare that they are suitable for
pediatric usage, the available information relating to many other families of pharmaceuticals is generally
acknowledged to be inadequate. See Regulations Requiring Manufacturers to Assess the Safety and Effectiveness of New Drugs and Biological Products in Pediatric Patients, 62 Fed Reg 43,900 (1997) (proposed
Aug 15, 1997) ("FDA Pediatric Testing Initiative-Proposed"). The most common form that such inadequacies take is the favoring of one or more small cohorts-as, for example, boys from eight years of age to
puberty-from within the general pediatric population. The cohort for which the absence of data is particularly striking is children under the age of two. FDA Pediatric Testing Initiative at 66,632 (cited in note
2).
29.
For discussions of these issues, see Christopher-Paul Milne, The PediatricStudies Incentive: Equal
Medicines ForAll (Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development 2001); Pediatric Drug Research: Hearing
Before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong, GAO-01-7057 (May 8, 2001)
(statement of Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care-Public Health Issues, General Accounting Office)
("Heinrich"); Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Food and Drug Administration ModernizationandAccountabiliy Act of 1997, S Rep No 105-43, at 51-52 (1997).
2 4
30.
Persons aged fourteen years and under made up only 1. /6 of the population in 2002, whereas
those forty-five and over constituted 44.4%. See <http://factfinder.census.gov/> (visited Nov 8, 2002).
The leading cause of death for those under thirty-four years of age is unintentional injuries,
31.
which seldom require cutting-edge drugs. The causes of death, however, for those forty-five years and
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tion to all of the outlays for clinical trials on adults, the pharmaceutical companies face certain additional expenses. 32 First, as the statute of limitations on tort
suits is tolled until children reach majority, pharmaceutical companies must
reckon with additional liability concerns. 33 While such causes of action might be
rare (we really don't know, as settlements are confidential), the risk is one
against which a company must nonetheless insure itself. Second, pediatric clinical trials are less revealing and more expensive than comparable trials for
adults. 34 This is due, in large measure, to the "additional protections" that the
pediatric regulations seek to provide for children. From the very beginning, the
prohibition on risky experimentation limits the scope of the experiments that
can be performed. Even after this hurdle has been passed, the researcher must
incur considerable expense in satisfying a range of other burdens that regulations impose upon the execution of the trial.3s
The practical consequences of these peculiar market dynamics are two-fold.
First-and most conspicuous--companies have shied away from developing
pharmaceuticals specifically tailored to the needs of pediatric patients. 36 The
preferred market, not surprisingly, is the geriatric.
Second-and more interesting-has been the companies' approach to the
testing and marketing of pharmaceuticals of general applicability. To obtain
marketing approval, drug manufacturers were only required (prior to the 1998
FDA initiative) to test a pharmaceutical on the general adult population. Accordingly, it was often the case that they would develop agents of likely applicability to both children and adults, but would decline to perform the applicable
tests on children. 37 The manufacturer was then obliged to state that the drug had
not been tested for use in pediatric populations. 38
On its face, this appears to be a deliberate decision to foreswear the benefits
of the pediatric market so as to avoid the host of problems attendant on pediatric pharmaceutical development and marketing. The reality of pediatric pharmaceutical development is, however, quite different. While the labels of such drugs
do carry disclaimers, everybody suspects that these drugs are likely to have the
same or similar indications in pediatric populations. 39 Not the least significant of

older are heart disease, cancer, cerebrovascular disease, and respiratory illness, all of which react to pharmacological treatment. See National Center for Health Statistics Vital Statistics System, Deaths: Leading
Causesfor 1999, 49 National Vital Statistics Reports (2001).
32.
Heinrich at 2 (cited in note 29).
33.
Milne, PediatricStudies Incentive at 4 (cited in note 29); Heinrich at 2 (cited in note 29); S Rep No
105-43 at 51 (cited in note 29).
34.
Milne, PediatricStudies Incentive at 4 (cited in note 29); Heinrich at 2 (cited in note 29).
35.
See S Rep No 105-43 at 51 (cited in note 29).
36.
Milne, PediatricStudies Incentive at 4 (cited in note 29); Heinrich at 2 (cited in note 29); S Rep No
105-43 at 51 (cited in note 29).
37.
See S Rep No 105-43 at 51 (cited in note 29).
38.
See Cot6, 98 Pediatrics at 118 (cited in note 28).
39.
See S Rep No 105-43 at 51 (cited in note 29).
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those so involved are the manufacturers themselves, who can have their cake, as
they say, and eat it too: On account of their calculated reluctance to pay for the
testing necessary to have their products authorized for pediatric usage (absent
such authorization, their tort liability to those who do employ them off-label is
generally avoided), they profit from the pediatric market nonetheless. 40
This arrangement presents practicing pediatricians with a terrible dilemma.
In the face of solid evidence that a particular medication can effectively treat
adults (or children in another cohort), the physician must decide whether to
stick with the standard treatment (if there is one) or try to adjust the dosage of
the untested drug to fit the particular child whom he is treating. Clinical data
suggest that pediatricians frequently opt for the latter. Of the ten drugs most
commonly prescribed to pediatric outpatients, all ten carry little or no informa41
tion concerning appropriate usage for different age groups.
The task, then, for the pediatrician who engages in this practice is to figure
out how the standard dosage should be altered for his patient. The literature
suggests that when physicians make their first stab at the problem they generally
seek to ascertain the dosage in one of three conventional ways. The first, and
most common, is to prorate the child's dosage from that of the adult on the
basis of the child's body weight. Alternatively, the physician can perform a similar calculation on the basis of the area of the child's body surface. Cruder, and
42
less frequently used, is prorationing on the basis of age.
While these approaches might, in the case of certain drugs, prove to be a
good first step in discerning the proper dosage, they are at best an exceedingly
blunt instrument. 43 Nowhere does this become more clear than in relation to an
infant. In addition to the easily discernable changes in physiology (massive increases in body weight, length, and surface area and the accompanying effusion
of sensory curiosity and motor skills), the capacities of the various organ systems
in the body change rapidly, remarkably, and, often enough, in a non-linear manner.44
Over the years, the administration of untested dosages of otherwise approved drugs led to a number of unfortunate mishaps to pediatric patients,
some quite well known. 45 Thus have we gathered-largely through planned
40.
See Cot&, 98 Pediatrics at 118 (cited in note 28).
41.
Drugs on this list include treatments for such relatively mundane afflictions as asthma and allergies and, more frighteningly, two behavior modification drugs, Zoloft and Ritalin. See FDA Pediatric
Testing Initiative-Proposed at 43,900 (cited in note 28). See also Cot6, 98 Pediatrics at 118 (cited in note
28); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, PreschoolMeds, NY Times Magazine, Nov 17, 2002, at 59.
42.
See FDA Pediatric Testing Initiative-Proposed at 43,901 (cited in note 28).
43.
See Ralph E. Kauffman, Scientific Issues in Biomedical Research with Children, in Children as Research
Subjects 29 (volume cited in note 14).
See id at 29-30.
44.
One of the earliest such cases of an adverse reaction to a drug's off-label usage (occurring in
45.
the late 1950s) was the development of "gray baby syndrome" in neonates following the administration of
chloramphenicol, an antibiotic. Five deaths were initially reported, with another eighteen subsequently,
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studies but also from the serendipity of fatal therapeutic misadventures-a substantial amount of information regarding the influence of pediatric growth and
development on the toxicity and effectiveness of commonly used pharmaceuticals. Increased knowledge concerning the composition and functional capacity
of organs and tissues, coupled with enhanced understanding concerning the
processes of metabolism, has enabled pediatricians to discern general trends of
46
some utility in establishing more effective dose formulation.
In spite of this progress, the practicing pediatrician must still ply his trade
with few and faulty tools. Not only have pharmaceutical companies declined to
develop medications to address specifically pediatric ailments, even after they
develop agents of potentially general applicability they deliberately choose not to
conduct the tests necessary to provide pediatricians with appropriate usage data.
While experience (often unfortunate) and systematic inquiry (albeit limited) have
certainly enhanced the basic analytical tools these physicians can use to adjust
adult dosages for pediatric applications, they still know relatively little about the
complex processes of children's growth and maturation and even less about the
interrelationships between their physiological development and the various
47
medications of potential benefit now extant.
C. MEDICINES FOR CHILDREN
Ever-inventive pharmaceutical research-however rewarding to drug manufacturers, satisfying to chemists and biologists, and promising to, say, geriatric
specialists-brought more than a vague cause for discontent to a contemporary
pediatric clinician. Pediatric patients-and their caregivers-were being left behind.
Mightily concerned-as early as the late 1970s-that the benefits of modem
medicine were coming to children slowly and incompletely, the American Academy of Pediatrics ("AAP") attempted to lobby the FDA to secure more aggres48
sive labeling requirements for drugs commonly used in pediatric medicine.
While it appears that they received a sympathetic hearing from the FDA, nothing was done in the 1980s to address the problem of pediatric labeling specifically.

49

until it was learned that a neonate's immature liver was unable to remove the drug from the body, resulting
in the fatal accumulation of toxic doses. FDA Pediatric Research Initiative-Proposed, at 43,901 (cited in
note 28). Other less dramatic but still serious incidents of unanticipated adverse reactions include the
development of kernicterus in premature infants from the use of sulfa drugs and the staining of enamel in
developing teeth from exposure to tetracycline antibiotics. Id.
46. See Kauffman, Children as Research Subjects at 37 (article cited in note 43).
47.
See id at 39-40.
48.
See Cot6, 98 Pediatrics at 120-21 (cited in note 28).
49.
The problems of pediatric patients were addressed at that time, rather, through more general
remedies, including the Orphan Drug Act of 1982, which provided pharmaceutical companies with financial incentives to encourage the development of drugs of proven efficacy to small patient populations
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As the problem became more acute in the late 1980s, the AAP returned
with more vigor-and political savvy. By bringing together a number of interested parties in a series of "consensus-building" symposia, the AAP was finally
able to persuade the FDA to join its cause. 50 The most immediate result was that
the FDA moved aggressively to obtain-on a "voluntary" basis-more detailed
pediatric information from drug manufacturers. 51 More importantly, it issued in
1994 another, more stringent, round of labeling requirements, the net effect of
which was to reverse field on the relationship between testing and indication of
potential pediatric usage.
Instead of requiring extensive testing before any information can be placed
in the "Indications and Usage" section, the FDA's revision allowed manufacturers to place in this section a broad range of information that might support pediatric use of the drug. 52 By taking data "based on adequate and well-controlled
studies in adults," and merely modifying it with pertinent pediatric information
(e.g., pharmacokinetic [movement of drugs within the body], safety, and pharmacodynamic [drug strength] data), a manufacturer could make the desired dosage information available to pediatricians and also legally claim that the drug had
a "pediatric indication." 53 The FDA could reasonably have thought that it was
making a very attractive offer indeed.
The pharmaceutical industry's response to this invitation was not nearly as
vigorous as the regulators had anticipated. In the period between the enactment
of the new rule and subsequent implementation of a new style of regulation in
1998, pediatric labeling supplements were submitted for only 430 drugs and
biologics, "a small fraction of the thousands of prescription drug and biological
54
products on the market," and most of the additions were trivial.
Jilted, as it were, the FDA decided in the mid-1990s to revamp the way in
which labeling information for pharmaceuticals is obtained. Instead of relying
(defined as fewer than 200,000 patients per year). Because the dearth of pediatric drugs was due, at least in
part, to the relatively small size of the pediatric market, this act distinctly benefited children suffering from
rare diseases, but offered no solution to the problem associated with the general need for pediatric labeling
of adult drugs. Carolyn H. Asbury, The Orphan Drug Act: The FirstSeven Years, 265 J Am Med Ass'n 893
(1991). Another federal statute, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub
L No 98-417, 98 Stat 1585 (1984), held forth the distinct possibility that labeling information might be
developed for pediatric applications. This act did not, however, result in any appreciable increase in the
labeling of adult drugs for children. See Cot6, 98 Pediatrics at 120-21 (cited in note 28).
50.
See id at 121; Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, Drug Development and the
Pediatric Population: Report of a Workshop (1991).
51.
See FDA Pediatric Testing Initiative-Proposed at 43,901-02 (cited in note 28).
52.
The existing rules, enacted in 1979, had required drug manufacturers to state pediatric indications and dosage information in a section tided "Indications and Usage." A statement placed in this section
of the labeling required that indication and dosage be based, unless waived, on substantial evidence derived
from adequate and well-controlled studies in pediatric populations. Specific Requirements on Content and
Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs; Revision of the "Pediatric Use" Subsection in Labeling, 59 Fed Reg 64,240 (1994).
53.
Id at 62,421.
54.
FDA Pediatric Testing Initiative at 66,632 (cited in note 2).
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on voluntarily provided information, the FDA decided to require manufacturers
to evaluate their products for safety and effectiveness in pediatric patients if the
product is likely to be used in a substantial number of cases or if the product
would provide a meaningful benefit over existing treatments.55 A draft version
was issued in August 1997, the final rule in December 1998.56
Hoping to support the change in FDA policy, the NIH also changed its
stance regarding the inclusion of children in the research it funds.57 In guidelines
released in March 1998 ("Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion of Children as
Participants in Research Involving Human Subjects"), the NIH states its ambitions: "The goal of this policy is to increase the participation of children in research so that adequate data will be developed to support the treatment modalities for disorders and conditions that affect adults and may also affect children."'5 8 Reversing its own long-standing policy that the use of children in NIHsponsored research must be limited, the NIH declared that "[it is the policy of
NIH that children (i.e., individuals under the age of 21) must be included in all
human subjects research, [sic] conducted or supported by the NIH, unless there
55.
See id at 66,634.
56.
The FDA's vigor can be discerned from its reaction to enactment in November 1997 of the
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, which established economic incentives for drug companies to conduct more pediatric studies. See FDAMA (cited in note 1). Under the FDAMA, the manufacturer of a drug protectable under either the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, see
Pub L No 98-417, 98 Stat 1585, or the Orphan Drug Act, Pub L No 97-414, 96 Stat 2049 (Jan 4, 1983),
could obtain a six-month extension of monopoly privileges if it provided the FDA with adequate pediatric
labeling for the agent. While pleased that Congress saw fit to enact this legislation (a similar proposal by
Sen. Nancy Kassebaum had died in committee, see Better Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 1994, S
2010, 103d Cong (1994)), the drafters of the FDA regulations did not think that these provisions of the
FDAMA were sufficiently aggressive to achieve the vast changes in pediatric drug labeling that the FDA
desired. See FDA Pediatric Testing Initiative at 66,633 (cited in note 2). According to these regulators,
Congress had failed, in enacting the FDAMA, to consider several issues that the FDA had wrestled with
over the past decade.
Most disconcerting to the regulators was Congress' dependence on voluntary response programs. See id.
The FDA had long ago concluded that voluntary programs such as the one enacted by these provisions of
the FDAMA did not work. Id. It believed, simply put, that few penny-pinching drug-mongers would go to
the significant expense of testing their products on several pediatric cohorts in order to gain the slight and
relatively short-term benefit of selling their wares for a mere six months more. Compare Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Children Test New Medicines Despite Doubts, NY Times, Feb 11, 2001, at Al.
Torn between its own good judgment and Congress' more cautious mandate, the FDA issued a unilateral compromise. In deference to the Congressional desire expressed in the FDAMA, the FDA decided to
allow the manufacturers of drugs covered by this act to submit labeling information on a voluntary basis
and receive, as authorized by the FDAMA, patent-protection extensions. However, should the FDA consider the study results inadequate, it reserved the right to order further testing. Additionally, the manufacturers of products not covered by the FDAMA would have to abide by the FDA's mandatory guidelines.
See FDA Pediatric Testing Initiative at 66,633 (cited in note 2).
Congress reaffirmed its preference for a voluntary testing regime in December 2001, when it extended
the FDAMA's patent incentive program for five years. See Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (cited in
note 1). See also Alice Dembner, PediatricTesting Program Extended: DrgmakersKeep Patent Incentive, Boston
Globe, Dec 20, 2001, at A8.
57.
See NIH Pediatric Guidelines at § II (cited in note 2).
58.

Id at

1.
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are scientific and ethical reasons not to include them." 59
This regulatory change was not, however, undertaken without opposition.
In October 2001 the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, the
Competitive Enterprise Institute, and Consumer Alert brought suit in the federal District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the FDA had no
authority to propound the "Pediatric Rule." 60 On March 18, 2002, in sympathetic reaction, the FDA-now controlled by Bush appointees-announced that
it would suspend enforcement of the "Pediatric Rule" for two years (beginning
May 10, 2002).61 In making its announcement, the FDA argued that its coercion
was unnecessary in light of congressional authorization-and reauthorizationof FDAMA's voluntary patent-extension regime. 62 This decision was immediately attacked and the FDA quickly backed down.63 One month later, Tommy
G. Thompson, DHHS Secretary, announced that he would "enforce and improve the FDA's pediatric rule." 64 The Secretary's capitulation was premature.
In October 2002 the District Court held that the FDA had indeed overstepped
65
its bounds.
Judge Kennedy's word is unlikely to be the last. Anticipating the possibility
of just such a ruling, supporters of the "Pediatric Rule" had already introduced
legislation in both houses of Congress, in April and May 2002, that would unequivocally grant such authority to the FDA. 66 To much fanfare (if New York
Times editorials count as such), the Senate bill was voted out of committee and
placed on the legislative calendar on August 1, 2002.67 In its haste to return to
the campaign trail, however, the Senate was unable to vote before adjournment
(which took place, incidentally, on the very day of Judge Kennedy's ruling). In
light of the strong support this bill obtained in committee (the vote was unanimous), the ardor of its supporters, and the lack of any organized opposition, the
"Pediatric Rule" will likely return, this time with unassailable statutory force. 68

59.
Id at § III.
60.
See Ass'n ofAm. Physidians and Surgeons v FDA, 2002 WL 31323411. See also Why Give Kids Drugs
Without Pediatric Testing?, USA Today, April 8, 2002, at A12; Sam Kazman, FDA Overreaches, USA Today,
April 8, 2002, at A12 (op-ed); Comment, Pediatric Testing of Prescrption Drugs: The Food and Drug Administralion's Carrot and Stick for the PharmaceuticalIndusty, 49 Am U L Rev 739, 744 (2000) (arguing that FDA lacks
authority to impose mandatory pediatric testing).
61.
See Ceci Connolly, FDA to Suspend a Rule on Child Drug Testing, Wash Post, March 19, 2002, at
AI0; Marilyn Elias, Plan to End PediatricDrug Trials Draws Fire, USA Today, April 3, 2002, at D9.
62.
See Connolly, FDA to Suspend a Rule on Child Drug Testing (cited in note 61).
63.
See Elias, Plan to End PediatricDrug Trials Draws Fire (cited in note 61).
64.
Marc Kaufman and Ceci Connolly, U.S. Backs Pediatric Tests in Reversal on Drug Safety, Wash
Post, April 20, 2002, at A3.
65.
See Ass'n ofAm. Physicians and Surgeons v FDA, 2002 WL 31323411.
66.
S 2394 (April 29, 2002); HR 4730 (May 14, 2002) (cited in note 4).
67.
The Need for PediatricDrug Tests, NY Times, Oct 14, 2002, at A18 ("Any senator who tries to
block its progress should be held accountable for endangering the health of children.").
68.
See Marc Kaufman, Court Strikes Down FDA Rule, Wash Post, Oct 18, 2002, at A9; Robert Pear,
Judge Voids Rules on PharmaceuticalTests, NY Times, Oct 19, 2002, at A9.
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II. EXEGESIS: HOW DOES 45 CFR § 46 MEAN TO PROTECT
CHILDREN?
In 1998 the FDA and NIH appeared to change course on the long-standing
inhibition of pediatric drug testing implicit in Subpart D. Appearances deceive.
Subpart D has not been replaced; the "additional protections" accorded to children since 1983 remain intact. The current state of the law is that both Subpart D
and the newer rules are in force: The older regime made exclusion of children
the default rule, the newer demands inclusion. Vigorous testing must extend to
the specially protected classes, but children must still be specially protected.
For many of the participants in this enterprise, this conflict appeared only
faintly on their radar screens, if at all. The FDA acknowledged the potential for
problems when it announced its new requirements, but declared (perhaps disingenuously) that children would continue to be safeguarded by the existing regulations. 69 Many within the executive branch have noted that testing will accelerate, but have phrased their concern in terms of the "safety" of children-not at
all in terms of the "dignity" interests emphatically protected by the preexisting
70
regulatory regime.
69.
See id at § IV.B.2; FDA Pediatric Testing Initiative at 43,906 (cited in note 2).
70.
That the foremost concern is safety is understandable in light of recent events. With the death
on September 17, 1999, of Jesse Gelsinger, an eighteen-year-old subject in a gene transfer therapy experiment, many of the parties actively promoting human biomedical research came to recognize that one of the
costs of this research agenda is risk to the subject, often a risk of more-than-trivial magnitude. The response was rapid. In October, President Clinton asked the National Bioethics Advisory Commission to
conduct a study to reexamine the system of protections for subjects of biomedical research. Neal F. Lane,
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Remarks at the 35th Meeting of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (Oct 22, 1999). In November the NIH imposed additional reporting requirements on gene therapy researchers, to which even more were added in March 2000. And in December,
Rep. John L. Mica (R-Fla.) held the first congressional hearing on the matter. House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, "Do Current
Federal Regulations Adequately Protect People Who Participate in Research?" (Dec 9, 1999). Since then at
least three additional hearings have been held. See Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, Subcommittee on Public Health, "Gene Therapy: What is the Federal Response for Patient
Safety?" (May 25, 2000) and "Gene Therapy: Is there Oversight for Patient Safety?" (Feb 2, 2000); House
Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, "Human Subject Research Protection" (May 3, 2000).
This initial response has been followed by a number of executive actions. In May 2000 President Clinton
& DHHS Secretary Shalala proposed changes to the rules governing the manner in which human experimentation is conducted, including (1)the direct observation of the consent process, (2) the renewal of
"informed consent" after adverse incidents, (3) conducting a public review of "informed consent" requirements, (4) increasing training requirements for researchers, (5) expanding IRB capacity to monitor ongoing trials, (6) conducting public hearings on financial conflicts of interest, and (7) imposing civil financial
penalties for non-compliance with federal regulations. White House Press Office, "President Clinton
Announces Strong New Steps to Protect the Safety of Patients Participating in Clinical Trials" (May 23,
2000) ("Clinton Safety Proposal"). On June 18, the DHHS removed the Office for Protection from Research Risks ("OPRR") from the NIH to the direct control of the Secretary and re-christened it the Office
for Human Research Protections ("OHRP"). 65 Fed Reg 37,136 (June 13, 2000). The Office of the Inspector General, DHHS, has issued a number of reports advocating extensive revamping of the system. See
Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, Recruiling Human Subjects:
Pressurrs
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It is Congress that appears to appreciate that more is at stake here than the
physical safety of child subjects. In late 2000, Congress passed, and President
Clinton signed into law, the Children's Health Act, which commands the Secretary of the DHHS to review the adequacy of Subpart D.71 The most salient aspect of this demand is the unique focus of its questions. While the statute manifests some congressional concern that increased safety might result from improvements in the institutional mechanisms of safety review, 72 its primary focus
73
is on the ethical integrity of the definitions and formulations of Subpart D.
The congressional diktat is, if I read this statute correctly, quite a bold one.
It orders the executive to ask a very hard question: Does a regulatory regime
grounded in the ethic of "voluntary informed consent" have the capacity to
protect child research subjects from assaults, not on their health alone, but on
their dignity also?
Unfortunately, the DHHS has not risen to the occasion. Instead of underin Indushy-SponsoredClinicalResearch, OEI-01-97-00195 (June 2000); ProtectingHuman Research Subjects: Status of
Recommendalions, OEI-01-97-00197 (April 2000); Institutional Review Boards: A Time for Reform, OEI-01-9700193 (une 1998). See also MedicalResearb on People, Wash Post, May 5, 2000 at A26.
71.
See Children's Health Act of 2000, Pub L No 106-310 § 1003 (Oct 17, 2000).
72.
(d) Consideration of Additional Provisions.-In conducting the review under subsection (a), the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall consider and, not later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, report to Congress concerning(1) whether the Secretary should establish data and safety monitoring boards or other mechanisms to
review adverse events associated with research involving children; and
(2) whether the institutional review board oversight of clinical trials involving children is adequate to
protect children.
Id at § 1003(d).
73.
(b) Areas of Review.-In conducting the review under subsection (a), the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall consider(1) the appropriateness of the regulations for children of differing ages and maturity levels, including
legal status;
(2) the definition of "minimal risk" for a healthy child or for a child with an illness;
(3) the definitions of "assent" and "permission" for child clinical research participants and their parents or guardians and of "adequate provisions" for soliciting assent or permission in research as
such definitions relate to the process of obtaining the agreement of children participating in research and the parents or guardians of such children;
(4) the definitions of "direct benefit to the individual subjects" and "generalizable knowledge about
the subject's disorder or condition";
(5) whether payment (financial or otherwise) may be provided to a child or his or her parent or guardian for the participation of the child in research, and if so, the amount and type given;
(6) the expectations of child research participants and their parent or guardian for the direct benefits
of the child's research involvement;
(7) safeguards for research involving children conducted in emergency situations with a waiver of informed assent;
(8) parent and child notification in instances in which the regulations have not been complied with;
(9) compliance with the regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, the monitoring
of such compliance, and enforcement actions for violations of such regulations; and
(10) the appropriateness of current practices for recruiting children for participation in research.
Id at § 1003(b).
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taking the searching examination that Congress ordered, it has (by way of the
Office for Human Research Protections and the National Human Research
Protections Advisory Committee) established a "Children's Workgroup," which
met only once within the statutorily imposed six-month period, 74 and then
drafted a ten-page report, in which it summarily asserted that "the regulations
for the protection of children as research subjects ... are sound, have worked in

the past and appear to be working now." 75 In lieu of a revision, the workgroup
recommended only that "a series of explanatory memoranda be developed and
promulgated" for the "clarification of several aspects of the regulations."7 6 Prior
to the expiration of the Advisory Committee's charter in July 2002, only one
77
such memorandum was drafted.
This decision is quite unfortunate. As I will demonstrate in the pages that
follow, the regulations that govern the practice of pediatric biomedical research
are more seriously flawed than this DHHS draft report suggests. A quarter century ago, Congress created a blue-ribbon commission to help regulators contrive
a human experimentation regime that could adequately deal with the fundamental problem presented by researchers' desire to experiment on children: Can the
otherwise normative principle of "voluntary informed consent" be transformed
so as to adequately govern researcher interactions with subjects commonly
thought incapable of granting such consent? It is my belief that the subsequently
enacted regulations failed to do this.
In the hope that Congress might pause before granting statutory status to
the DHHS's "Pediatric Rule," or, failing that, demand a more earnest revision of
Subpart D, I offer the following analysis.
A. THE BELMONT REPORT: PROTECTIONS FOR ALL RESEARCH
SUBJECTS
The intellectual foundation of the regulatory scheme that emerged in the
early 1980s can be found in two committee documents written in the late 1970s.
In 1974, shortly after the DHEW had hastily drafted a rule,7 8 Congress created
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research to think more carefully about the issues at stake and to
formulate a report to guide the construction of a more finely wrought apparatus. 79
74.
National Human Research Protections Advisory Committee, Cbildren's Workgroup Report 1
(April 5, 2001).
75.
Id at 10.
76.
Id.
77.
See Alan Fleischman, Minimal Risk, Minor Increment over Minimal Risk, and Disorder/Condition,
Presentation to the National Human Research Protections Advisory Committee, Washington, D.C. (April
30, 2002) <http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/nhrpac/mtgs.htm> (visited Nov 8, 2002).
78.
See Protection of Human Subjects: Policies and Procedures, 38 Fed Reg 31,738 (1973).
79.
See National Research Act at § 201-202 (cited in note 7). The National Commission's founda-
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In crafting its reports, the National Commission was presented with a
unique challenge. Instead of being charged with the task of merely extending
and refining the DHEW rules, the Commission was asked to formulate general
guidelines that would assist the regulators in their upcoming drafting duties and,
quite exceptionally, to give the regulation's interpreters (lawyers and laymen
alike) philosophical rules of thumb illuminating their application. 80 Although the
document is easily derided as logically self-contradictory, the National Commission succeeded in performing its dual function: It enunciated a widely shared
and easily comprehensible set of principles that were reflected in the final regulations. Since that time the Belmont Report has also guided public discussion
81
relating to the regulation of biomedical research.
1. Philosophic Principles
True to its dual mandate, the National Commission's Belmont Report first
spelled out three basic ethical principles and then demonstrated how they might
manifest themselves in the actual practice of human-subject research.
Respectfor Persons: The first of these, "respect for persons," is the pronunciation, with an important twist, of the patently Kantian doctrine that serves as a
pillar of modern liberal thought: "m]ndividuals should be treated as autonomous
agents." 82 The twist-a very important one-is this: Those who are not
"autonomous agents" are entitled to special protection from invitations to join
research protocols. The practical manifestation of this principle is twofold, depending upon the faculties of the subject:
Potential research subjects considered "autonomous agents" may be freely
enrolled in research provided that (1) the investigator adequately reveals the
nature of the project, (2) the presentation is comprehensible to the potential
subject, and (3) the subject is not the victim of unjustifiable pressure to enroll in
the study.
With respect to those persons deemed to have "diminished autonomy," participation in research should take place under the most limited and carefully
scrutinized circumstances, if at all. Specifically mentioned as in this category are
infants, young children, the mentally disabled, and prisoners.
The second and third principles of the Belmont Report invoke a more utilitarian doctrine by asking researchers to pay careful attention to the conse-

tional document was the Belmont Report (cited in note 21). The chronologically prior work, Report and Recommendations: Research Involving Children (cited in note 26), applied the principles soon to be released in the
Belmont Report to research involving children.
80.
See National Research Act at S 202(a)(1)(A)(ii) (cited in note 7).
81.
See, for example, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Ethical and Poliq Issues in Research
Involving Human Particioation: Summary 2 (Aug 2001); Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioetbics 103-106 (Oxford

1998).
82.

Belmont Report at § B.1 (cited in note 21).
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quences of their work, both positive and negative.
Beneficence: The second principle, "beneficence," addresses the issue of effects at the individual level. 83 Its two components are, first, to "do no harm"
and, second, to "maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms." The
first of these, the authors declare, is a simple restatement of the long-standing
Hippocratic maxim. Though this second component of "beneficence" could
easily be read as a Benthamite (i.e., utilitarian) equivocation upon the Hippocratic/Kantian first component, the National Commission, it appears, intends it
to function as a complementary principle. Regardless of the incoherence of this
formulation, the authors' intention-made manifest in their subsequent application of the principle-is that all decisions regarding the design and implementation of a research protocol should seek to balance benefits against risks. The
researcher should, of course, attempt to minimize, even eliminate, any risk to the
individual subjects. If the researcher is unable to eliminate the risk (as is usually
the case), he should then not invite patients to become research subjects unless
the benefit clearly outweighs the risks.
Justice. The third principle, "justice," asks researchers to pay attention to the
allocation of risks and benefits at the societal level. 84 Recognizing that it is typically the case that one class (the poor and disenfranchised) bears the burdens of
scientific research while another (the wealthy and powerful) derives the benefits,
the authors of this report argue that "just" research would ensure that members
of a class unlikely to reap the subsequent practical benefits of a study not be
asked to participate in such research. In practical terms, they suggest that implementing this principle might require a reversal in the natural order of things:
First the rich and mighty, only later the poor and weak, ought to serve as guinea
pigs.
2. Practical Implementation
Given the utopian note on which the Belmont Report ends, it is remarkable
how strongly it influenced the subsequent formulation of the DHHS regulations. The least surprising manifestation of the Belmont principles is that
"autonomy," the first part of the principle of "respect for persons," is addressed
most prominently. Under the banner of "voluntary informed consent," these
rules first demand that the researcher obtain documentation of consent from the
subject or his legally authorized representative; they then articulate a further
demand, spelling out in meticulous detail the informational elements that must
be found in the paper that the patient eventually signs. 85
These exceedingly elaborate requirements demanding "voluntary informed
83.
84.
85.

Id at § B.2.
Id at § B.3.
See Subpart A at § 46.116-17 (cited in note 22).
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consent" are moderated at both extremes, however, by rules derived from the
second principle ("beneficence"), the concern that research protocols effectively
minimize, if not eliminate, the risks to which the individual research subjects will
be exposed. 86 Accordingly, the regulations seek to constrain the adventuresome
and empower the cautious.
To constrain: Even if the subject were willing and eager to consent, there
are certain sorts of investigations to which the researcher may not invite him.
He may not be invited to participate in a protocol in which the procedures are
not "consistent with sound research design and which... unnecessarily expose
subjects to risk.''87 If, however, the risk exposure is necessary, the risks to the
subjects must be "reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to
result."

88

To empower: In a number of narrowly defined cases where the process of
obtaining "informed consent" will, for all intents and purposes, prevent the
research from being carried out, the researcher may omit or modify aspects of
the "consent" documentation or, in more extreme cases, forgo the "consent"
process altogether,8 9 provided, inter alia, that the "research involves no more
than minimal risk to the subjects." 90
In translation, the Belmont principle that suffered the greatest distortion
was the third: "justice." The DHHS regulations do command, as did the Belmont Report, that in formulating a protocol the researcher should ensure that
the "[s]election of subjects is equitable," 91 and then goes on to note that these
researchers should be "particularly cognizant of the special problems of research
involving vulnerable populations, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women,
mentally disabled persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons." 92 Other than this vacuous admonition, the general regulations have noth-

ing more to say about vulnerable populations as such. The National Commission's appeal to an egalitarian redistribution of the benefits and burdens of the
medical research agenda does not seem to have commanded the respect of the
actual regulators.

86.
Id at § 46.111 (1). The requirement of "informed consent" can be either a blessing or a curse to
a researcher, depending on the refinement of his moral sensibilities and the nature of his inquiries. To the
unscrupulous, it is a blessing in that his duly acquired receipt of the subject's "informed consent" can easily
serve as the justification for research in which the subject runs risks entirely out of proportion to the protocol's anticipated benefits (either for the patient or the medical community). To the scrupulous, it is a
curse in that he must, for every inquiry, inflict these papyrian procedures on his subjects, even if their
interposition would practically destroy his experiment.
87.

Id at § 46.11 l(1)(i).

88.

Id at §46.111(2).

89.

See id at § 46.116(c)-(d).

90.

Id at § 46.116(d)(1).

91.

Id at § 46.111(3).

92.

Id.
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B. SUBPART D: "ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS" FOR CHILDREN
The regulators' refusal to provide more specific guidance concerning research on children and other "vulnerable populations" should not lead us to
conclude that the DHHS ignored the third Belmont principle altogether. The
scandals and concerns motivating the National Commission to propose the
principle of "justice" do dominate the DHHS regulations, but in a manner that
avoids invoking that principle per se.
The locus of these rules, Title 45, Part 46, of the Code of Federal Regulations, is divided into four subparts: A, B, C, and D. The first and longest of
these, tided "Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects," sets forth
the basic standards for consent and subject-level risk/benefit analysis that govern all research under the DHHS umbrella. It is in the subsequent three subparts
where the influence of the "justice" principle can be discerned. Each of theseSubparts B, C, and D--delineates the additionalprotections that should be accorded, respectively, to pregnant women on behalf of their fetuses, prisoners,
and children: three discrete and vulnerable populations specifically mentioned in
the National Commission's discussion of "justice."
The most distinctive feature of these three populations is not that they are
losers in some equitable calculus, namely, that research performed on them
yields therapies for other groups. 93 It seems, rather, that the regulators extended
additional protection to these groups on account of their limited ability to consent to (or decline) participation. In the words of the first section of the Belmont Report, these are people deserving of protection on account of their "di'94
minished autonomy.
Whether these additional protections for fetuses, prisoners, and children
found their way into the federal regulations under the influence of the first Belmont principle or the third, it is clear that all parties who had a hand in drafting
them-including legislators, blue-ribbon commissions, and the regulators themselves-considered these protections to be an important part of this regulatory
scheme.
Like the basic DHHS regulations, the objective of the regulations touching
on children-Subpart D-is to balance our communal desire that research subjects be protected from invitations to participate in inordinately risky experiments against the personaldesire of patients and their representatives to have and
exercise some discretion regarding the nature and scope of the bodily incursions
and risks to which child research subjects will be exposed.

93.
94.

This is, nonetheless, a prominent feature of research on prisoners.
National Commission, Belmont Repot at S B.1 (cited in note 21).
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1. Risk Minimization
In the realm of ordinary medical research this drama of conflicting desires
plays itself out between consenting adults-where both maturity and consent are
significant-in the course of the screening that occurs before a patient is ever
invited to become the subject of a study. The regulations require the principal
investigator and the institutional review board to minimize the risk that the protocol entails; if a significant risk remains, the researchers must certify that it is
counterbalanced by a corresponding benefit, either to the subject or to the larger
community. 95
This risk/benefit dynamic is even more pronounced in the pediatric regulations. 96 In formulating and approving experiments on children, the principal
investigator and the IRB are required to be significantly more cautious in their
evaluation of the risks to which subjects will be exposed. In research involving
adults, all that the research community must do is minimize and balance: Very
dangerous protocols can be approved if the potential benefit is correspondingly
significant. Under these rules, it is conceivable that somewhat milder versions of
the experiments conducted by Dr. Karl Brandt and his fellow concentrationcamp "physicians"-add consent, subtract foreordained fatality-could pass
muster. The goal of the pediatric regulations, on the other hand, is to narrow the
breadth of these parameters. The basic risk-level rule dictated by the pediatric
regulations is that the research protocol must present the child with "no greater
97
than minimal risk."
But "greater than minimal risk" is allowed under three circumstances. 98 The
most permissive standard is applied to research protocols that "[hold] out the
prospect of direct benefit for the individual subject." 99 In these circumstances
(commonly, if somewhat euphemistically, referred to as "therapeutic research"),
the protocol may subject the child to "more than minimal risk."100 While this
exception is quite permissive (both in theory and in practice), the regulations do
seek to constrain it by requiring that the "risk [be] justified by the anticipated
benefit to the subjects"'' 1 and that the "relation of the anticipated benefit to the
risk [be] at least as favorable to the subjects as that presented by available alternative approaches,"' 0 2 a situation commonly referred to as "clinical equi03
poise."1
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See Subpart A at § 46.111(2) (cited in note 22).
I would refer the reader at this point to the Appendix.
Subpart D at S 46.404 (cited in note 5). See also Appendix, Category I.
Subpart D at § 46.405. See also Appendix, Categories II, III & IV.
Subpart D. See also Appendix, Category II.

100. Subpart D at §46.405 (cited in note 5).
101.
Id at § 46.405(a).
102.
Id at § 46.405(b).
103.
See generally Loretta M. Kopelman, Research Methodology: Controlled Clinical Trials, in Warren
Thomas Reich, ed, Enyclopedia of Bioethics 2278 (MacMillan, 2d ed 1995); Don Marquis, An Argument thatAll
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The researcher may also subject the child to procedures involving "more
than minimal risk"'' °4 if the research is "likely to yield generalizable knowledge
about the subjects' disorder or condition."' 105 This standard (also quite permissive) is constrained, nonetheless, by the requirement that the increased risk represent no more than a "minor increase over minimal risk"'106 and that the procedure "[present] experiences to subjects that are reasonably commensurate with
those inherent in their actual or expected medical, dental, psychological, social,
'107
or educational situations.
Risky research that cannot be shoehorned into either of these two frameworks may also be performed if the researcher can make a showing that the
"research presents a reasonable opportunity to further the understanding, prevention, or alleviation of a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of
children."' 108 Approval for such an experiment can be obtained upon petition to
the Secretary of the DHHS, but only after a panel report and public comment. 10 9

2. Consent
The general research regulations seek to ensure the adult subject's autonomy
by allowing him ample discretion regarding the protocols in which he will
choose to participate after the IRB has screened out those projects exhibiting
minimal scientific merit and unfavorable risk/benefit balances. Like the general
research regulations, the pediatric rules also seek to provide the potential research subject and his legal guardians with a certain degree of freedom to make
decisions regarding his participation.
This impulse at the core of the regulatory movement of the 1970s-to restore autonomy to the subjects of biomedical research-faces, of course, a fundamental, even ineluctable, problem in the realm of pediatric research, tZ., that
a child simply cannot give legally binding "voluntary informed consent." To
work around this problem, the regulators contrived a scheme of proxy consent.
The child cannot legally speak for himself, yet he might well (and often does)
have distinct and volubly articulated apprehensions regarding the specific assaults on his body to which his guardian has consented. Accordingly, this
scheme seeks to accommodate both the wishes of the parent(s) and the conPrerandomi.Zed Clinical Trials are Unethical, in Edward Erwin et al, eds, Ethical Issues in Sdenific Research: An
Antbology 159 (Garland 1994); Eugene Passamani, Clinical Trials-Are They Ethical?, 324 New Eng J Med
1589 (1991); Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research, 317 New Eng J Med 141-45
(1987).
104. Subpart D at § 46.406 (cited in note 5).
105.
Id at § 46.406(c). See also Appendix, Category III.
106.
Subpart D at § 46.406(a) (cited in note 5).
107.
Id at 46.406(b).
108.
Id at § 46.407(b)(2)(i). See also Appendix, Category IV.
109.
Subpart D at § 46.407(b)(2)(i) (cited in note 5). Because of the extraordinary nature of the approval process, it is not surprising that only seven research projects have been authorized in this manner.
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cerns of the child.
To strike this balance, the pediatric regulations seek to modulate the consent that must be obtained from each party on the basis, once again, of (1) the
magnitude of the risks and (2) the relationship between these risks and the benefit that the child might derive from participation. As the risk increases and the
potential personal benefit declines, the more formal must be the manifestation
of theparents'reflection on their grant of permission to proceed.110
As regards the child's personal willingness to participate in experimentation,
however, the element of risk-the factor that plays such a crucial role in determining the nature of required parental "permission"-becomes utterly irrelevant. In determining whether the "assent" of the child must be obtained, the
pediatric regulations look, rather, to two other criteria: the presence of a potential benefit for the child and the child's maturity. The basic rule, as set forth in §
46.408(a), declares that the child's "assent" is a "necessary condition for proceeding with the research." There are, however, three rather significant exceptions to this rule. The most strikingly powerful one mirrors the parental "permission" requirements: If "the research holds out a prospect of direct benefit
that is important to the health or well-being of the child and that benefit is available only in the context of the research, the 'assent' of the child is not a necessary condition for proceeding with the research.""' Child-subject "assent," in
sum, is given no high priority.
But the most significant exception is Subpart D's tremendous deference to
the discretion of the IRB that screens the protocol. In determining a child's capability to "assent," the IRB must reckon with no strict formulations regarding
risk, chronological cohort, etc. The regulations merely declare that "the IRB
shall take into account the ages, maturity, and psychological state of the children
involved." 112 Even after establishing a general rule regarding "assent" for a particular protocol, the IRB may waive the "assent" requirement if it determines
that "the capability of some or all of the children is so limited that they cannot
reasonably be consulted." 113 Finally, the IRB may "waive the assent requirement," even where it has "determine[d] that the subjects are capable of assenting," in those circumstances where obtaining the "assent" would jeopardize the
successful completion of the protocol. On account of the several substantial
exceptions to the "assent" requirement, it is hard to see how, precisely, this ad-

110.
In the two low-risk research classifications, the IRB may allow research in which only one of the
child's parents (or guardians) grants "permission." Subpart D at § 46.408(b) (cited in note 5). See also
Appendix, Categories I & II. In the other two, where the research is more dangerous and less beneficial,
the researcher must obtain "permission" from both parents, unless one is "deceased, unknown, incompetent, or not reasonably available, or when only one parent has legal responsibility for the care" of the child.
Subpart D at § 46.408(b) (cited in note 5). See also Appendix, Categories III & IV.
Subpart D at § 46.408(a) (cited in note 5). See also Appendix, Category II.
111.
112.
Subpart D at § 46.408(a) (cited in note 5).
113.
Id.
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ditional requirement is supposed to provide "additional protection" for those
children whom physicians, researchers, and parents have chosen to enroll in
biomedical research.
C. SUMMARY
In the translation of popular rage into administrative rules (by way of congressional hearings and blue-ribbon committees), it is to be expected that differences in emphasis and degree will emerge. Surprising indeed would be a perfect
fit between the final rules and their demotic genesis. The case of Subpart D is
no exception. The impulse was the sense (growing since the 1940s but crystallized in the early 1970s) that medical researchers were insufficiently respectful of
the dignity that all-even the powerless and abandoned--do finally possess.
This concern remained relatively strong through Sen. Kennedy's Tuskegee hearings and the reports of the newly minted National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The National
Commission expected the autonomous to protect their own dignity through the
processes of "informed consent"; it expected the state, however, to protect the
dignity of the vulnerable by shielding them from such invitations. In so doing, it
leaned heavily upon the concept of "justice": Researchers should not use a vulnerable population group (e.g., poor blacks or mentally disabled wards of the
state) to benefit another (e.g., urban debauche~s or the United States Marines).
A noteworthy transformation occurred, however, when these reports were
redacted into Subpart D. Instead of protecting vulnerable populations by way of
research bans-either categorical or qualified-the regulations sought to protect
them by way of the "informed consent" process. This conflict is not insuperable
in the case of the illiterate sharecropper. The integrity of his consent can in fact
be assured if the researcher truly takes pains to be honest, clear, and patient. The
case of the child cannot, unfortunately, be so easily resolved in that manner. No
child, no matter how well he understands the import of the procedure, can give
legally binding "voluntary informed consent." In spite of this legal factum, the
drafters of Subpart D worked hard to craft a replacement: The parent(s) give
their "permission" and the child gives his "assent." Can such a procedure be an
adequate substitute?

III. CRITIQUE: CAN A CHILD GIVE "VOLUNTARY INFORMED
CONSENT"?

A. OBTAINING "PERMISSION" FROM PARENTS
Concerning one issue the pediatric regulations are clear: Except under ex-
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traordinary circumstances, the permission of at least one parent is necessary if a
child is to participate in any experiment. It makes sense that this, at the very
least, is to be a minimum requirement for enrollment. It is a long-standing tradition in the Western world that parents have tremendous discretion to make decisions for their children regarding a whole range of very important matters. It is
parents, after all, who make or facilitate decisions concerning a child's education,
14
religion, habits, sexual initiation, etc.
This is perhaps even more true in the context of medical treatment. The law
generally acknowledges that parents are in the best position to determine what
sort of treatment is best for the child and the family and, not trivially, that parents must significantly bear the untoward consequences of a failed therapeutic
attempt. A previous generation focused on the financial loss: A medical misadventure resulting in a handicapped child imposes significant burdens on the
family and deprives it of the child's subsequent services.11 5 We now speak of the
loss in terms of forgone companionship.
But the issue at hand-the requirement that a child's participation in research cannot occur without parental permission-is considerably more complex than that. The most obvious complication is, of course, that parental dominion over children is not unlimited. The state limits corporal punishment,
requires a certain form of education for a specified term of years, restricts the
type of labor that children may perform, prohibits incest, and, not insignificandy, requires parents to emancipate their children at the age of eighteen.
The same complexity can be found in the medical context. In a previous
generation, courts were generally willing to respect parental decisions to withhold treatment for a variety of significant medical procedures (e.g., repair of a
hare-lip and cleft palate and treatment of non-fatal spinal degeneration) but almost invariably intervened when parents refused to consent to life-saving treatment of proven effectiveness and trivial risk (e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses whose
children are dying from blood loss). 11 6 This presumption has noticeably waned
over the years, especially since 1972, when the New York Court of Appeals ordered a fifteen-year-old boy who suffered from neurofibromatosis (the "elephant man disease ' ) to undergo extensive plastic surgery, in spite of his
mother's religiously based objections." 7 Courts are now willing, at the very least,
to entertain the possibility that in extreme circumstances a parentally chosen
medical intervention can be trumped by the state's own choice of therapy.1 18
The pediatric regulations reflect this trend. Even though parents have broad
114.
See, for example, Pierrev Sey
of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925).
115.
See Lacy v Laird, 166 Ohio 12, 139 NE2d 25 (1956).
116.
See, for example, In reSeiferth, 309 NY 80, 127 NE2d 820 (1955); In re Green, 448 Pa 338, 292
A2d 387 (1972). See generally Leonard H. Glantz, The Law of Human Experimentation with Children, in Children
as Researrh Subjects 103, 104-106 (volume cited in note 14).
117.
See In re Sampison, 29 NY2d 900, 278 NE2d 918 (1972).
118.
See, for example, In re Hobauer,47 NY2d 648, 393 NE2d 1009 (1979).
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authority to make decisions regarding their children's participation in biomedical
research, these choices can be and are limited by the state. Because, however,
much medical research on children occurs in a therapeutic context and is specifically intended to provide some medical benefit to the child, the federal regulations governing pediatric research are, in this regard, still relatively permissive. In
the tradition of deference to parental decisions, the regulations allow parents to
enroll children in risky research protocols so long as the intervention holds out
the prospect of some benefit for the child.
1. The Problem of Proxy Consent
The vexing complication arises, however, from the fact that plenty of medical research occurs which does not hold out the prospect of direct and personal
medical benefit. The question that then arises is a terribly challenging one: May
parents, those people peculiarly entrusted with the responsibility of protecting
their child from the buffetings of the world, consent that he be subjected to
potentially harmful procedures from which he will receive no benefit whatsoever? Does the duty to guide and protect preclude this sort of consent? Some
parents might be interested in sacrificing their child's health and comfort for the
greater good of medicine, but why would the child-utterly unwilling to share
his toys-be willing to make repeated and painful donations of his spinal fluid?
But the fact remains that the child has no legal voice and, barring unusual circumstances, it is the parent who must speak for him. To what sort of standard
should this proxy be held?
Traditional standards for proxy consent in other realms of medical research
and care provide some limited guidance.11 9 When an adult becomes incompetent, surrogate decisions are often made in accordance with three hierarchically
ordered principles. The first, and preferred, option is that the patient's treatment
conform to the directives he laid out before the onset of his debilitation. Because the sound-in body and mind-are rarely inclined to imagine the multitude of ways they might become debilitated and thus to lay out adequate guidance, their caregivers must turn to other, less prescriptive methods of guiding
the physician. Preferable is the exercise of substituted judgment: What would he
want were he now capable of speaking? Least favored is the task of determining
what course of treatment is in the "best interests" of the afflicted. Translated
into legal jargon, the proxy must here act as a fiduciary.
But when we try to apply each of these standards to the question at hand we
see how unique the conundrum is. The first rule is clearly inapplicable, given
that a child, prior to finding himself in this situation, has never had legal authority to declare his will. That the second offers a certain appeal-and debilities-is
119.
See generally Dan W. Brock, Ethical Issues in Exposing Children to Risks in Research, in Children as
Research Subjects 81, 84-85 (volume cited in note 14).
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suggested by the debate started in the 1970s between two theologians, Richard
McCormick and Paul Ramsey. 20 The basic argument advanced by McCormick
for the exercise of substituted judgment holds that parents are indeed capable of
assuming, with a certain knowledge of their child's fundamental goodwill, that
he would be more than willing-absent the fright of the moment-to act altruistically: "[Hie would choose this were he capable of choice because he 'ought'
to do so.''112 The riposte articulated by Ramsey is far more libertarian: "No child
or adult incompetent can choose to become a participating member of medical
undertakings, and no one else on earth should decide to subject these people to
22
investigations having no relation to their own treatment."'
The most illuminating, however, is the third approach, that the proxy must
act in the "best interests" of the child. This standard has a certain visceral attraction: Most parents would instinctively say that they always act in the best interests of their children. Not necessarily. Parental dedication to the child's "best
interests" is assumed, but this is neither legally nor logically self-evident: The
Supreme Court has indicated that a child's interest can be perceived as separable
from his parents' estimation thereof.123
Careful examination of asserted parental dedication to a child's "best interests" reveals that this parental assertion can be subject to various interpretations,
especially in the context of biomedical research. On the one hand, it can be argued that this standard, when interpreted as a "fiduciary duty," is far too exacting for any parent, save the pathologically overbearing. In the day-to-day familial
struggle to satisfy adequately the needs of a variety of constituencies-including
but not limited to employers, spouses, friends, community, and, not to be forgotten, other children-every parent inevitably falls far short of acting in the
"best interests" of any given child. Kids are dragged on shopping trips, sit in
pediatricians' waiting rooms with their siblings, get dumped early in the morning
into for-profit day-care centers, are left in the evening with channel-surfing
baby-sitters, and are ignored by their father at the end of the day as he unwinds
in front of the tube with a can of cold beer cradled in his limp hands. Undivided
See Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person: Explorationsin Medical Ethics 11-58 (Yale 1970); Richard
120.
A. McCormick, Proxy Consent in the Experimentation Situation, 18 Persp Biology & Med 2 (1974); Paul Ramsey, A Rep# to RichardMcCormick." The Enforcement of Morals: NontherapeuticResearch on Children, Hastings Ctr
Rpt, Aug 1976, at 21; Richard A. McCormick, Experimentation in Children: Sharing in Sociality, Hastings Ctr
Rpt, Dec 1976, at 41; Paul Ramsey, Children as Research Subjects: A Rep#, Hastings Ctr Rpt, Apr 1977, at 40.
See generally Lainie Friedman Ross, Children as Research Su'ects:A Proposalto Revise the CurrentFederalRegulations Using a MoralFramework,8 Stan L & Pol'y Rev 159, 160 (1997).
121.
McCormick, 18 Persp Biology & Med at 9 (cited in note 120). A stronger version of this argument, invoking a pedestrian form of Aristotelian teleology, posits that parents, because they play a fundamental role in developing the child's persona, can reasonably presume that the child, upon reaching maturity, will share his parents' social goals: Because it is I, the father, who will determine what sort of person
my son will become, I am most uniquely situated to divine the will of that man-to-be!
122.
Ramsey, The Patientas Person at 14 (cited in note 120).
123.
See generally Parham v R., 442 US 584, 603 (1979) (considering a teen-age girl's claim that her
parents' decision to institutionalize her was appropriately contestable).
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attention, such as a "fiduciary" must give, to the identifiable interests of his cestui
que trust is not the standard by which parents normally act. This standard would,
if its implications were teased out, categorically exclude any research on children
that does not hold out at least the prospect of some direct benefit for the child
inquestion.
Interpreted slightly more generously, however, "best interests" is a quite capacious standard. While a child's intellectual development might well be best
secured by spending his mornings at the local Montessori school rather than
being stunted by trips to the store to procure food and clothing, bored by too
many hours in doctors' waiting rooms, angered when left with sitters, and saddened by an unfocused father, the aim of each of these things-protection from
starvation, exposure, and untreated disease at home, not to mention the preservation of parental sanity-contributes, each in its own way, to the child's longterm "best interests."
Many have argued that a child's participation in medical experimentation is
one way in which his "best interests" can be promoted, even if-or perhaps
especially if-the intervention holds out no prospect of direct medical benefit
for that child.12 4 Parents regularly ask their children to give up something they
treasure-a favorite toy, the good graces of an exclusive school-yard clique, or
their playtime-to provide a more bountiful Christmas to kids on the other side
of the tracks, to befriend ostracized classmates, or to cheer up the denizens of
the local nursing home. While much of this is requested in the genuine belief
that the child's actions might actually make the world a better place, this sort of
parental initiative likely aims rather more at the positive psychological development of their own child. As a number of observers of the biomedical research
enterprise have noted, it is surely possible that the same instinct can motivate
parents to enroll their children in biomedical experiments: This is yet another
context in which children might develop the charitable instincts that parents
want them to possess.
At least one parent is on record as declaring as much. Upon being told by a
researcher that his son's refusal to donate a small sample of blood for research
purposes-in spite of the father's clearly articulated desire to the contrarywould be respected as binding, the father angrily exclaimed: "This is my child. I
was less concerned with the research involved than with the kind of boy that I
was raising. I'll be damned if I was going to allow my child, because of some
idiotic concept of children's rights, to assume that he was entitled to be a selfish,
125
narcissistic little bastard."'
124.
See William G. Bartholome, Parents, Children, and the Moral Benefits of Research, Hastings Ctr Rpt,
Dec 1976, at 44; Henry K. Beecher, Research and the Individual 63 (Little 1970); Terrence F. Ackerman,
Fooling Ourselves itb Child Autonomy andAssent in Nontherapeutic Clinical Research, 27 Clinical Res 345 (1979).
See generally Lois A. Weithorn & David G. Scherer, Children's Involvement in Research ParticipationDecisions:
Pychological Considerations,in Children as Research Subjects 133 (volume cited in note 14).
125.
Brock, Children as Research Subjects at 89 (article cited in note 119).
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2. Research Promotion Strategies
That being said, what standard of proxy consent do the regulations present
to investigators (and their institutions' lawyers) who wish to maximize the participation of children in their studies? The answer, I think, is that the regulations
allow the designers of ambitious research protocols to make one of two moves:
to characterize the research as beneficial to the child at hand, or, if that is not
possible, beneficial to the practice of pediatric medicine or the development of
pediatric bioscience.

a. "DirectBenefit"
The first, most easily justified strategy, is to find some way of representing
the research as actually being of "direct benefit" to the child. This can, as suggested above, proceed on two levels.

(1) Therapeutic
First, and most easily, the protocol can be classified as being of potential
medical benefit to the child. Under such a rubric, almost any research protocol
can be legally defended if the prospect of a "therapeutic" effect can be identified. While such an intervention is subject to two constraints-that (1) the benefits outweigh the risks and that (2) its therapeutic potential be at least as great as
customary treatment-these provide little protection in many practical circumstances. Pediatric oncological testing provides a good illustration. Even the most
preliminary of chemotherapeutic trials-a test to determine how much of a drug
it takes to kill a patient--can plausibly be represented as being of "direct benefit" to the child dying of cancer: We have tried everything else; this might work.
Besides, the possibility of extended life dwarfs several months of discomfort.

(2) Psychological
On the second level, a researcher can seek to define the "benefits" to the
subject as psychological in character. Even though this would require a more
permissive interpretation of the fiduciary-beneficiary relationship, there is good
reason to believe that this could pass muster. First, the pediatric regulations
speak only in terms of "the subject's well-being" and "direct benefit,"1126 not in
terms limited to corporeal health. The pediatric regulations put few additional
restrictions on any research that "holds out the prospect of direct benefit for the
individual subject."' 127 So long as the risk is "justified" by the "anticipated bene-

126.
127.

Subpart D at S 46.405-406 (cited in note 5).
Id at § 46.405.
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fit" to the subject, almost anything goes. 28 Second, one could seriously argue, as
have Terrence Ackerman et a., that the psychological benefit accruing to the
child presents a powerful case for the inclusion of those children of sufficient
maturity to understand the import of their actions. Third, the case law might
129
well sustain such a recategorization.

b. Utility
The second move a researcher can make is to resort to a broad-based utilitarian justification for experimenting on children. Even if the intervention cannot provide a benefit--corporeal or psychological-to the child at hand, a utilitarian calculation (one that includes the benefits which might accrue to those
future children whose condition might be alleviated by the increase in biomedical knowledge obtained by way of the experiment) can be invoked to justify
pediatric research.
Given a choice, this is not the argument to which a researcher should have
to resort in order to justify his protocol. Not only is it disfavored among the
ethicists 130 (the regulatory impulse that led to the Belmont Report was, after all,
largely Kantian in sentiment, celebrating personal dignity rather than Benthamite
utilitarianism), both of the courts that have examined the issue were also not
terribly impressed. As Judge David Ross of New York declared: "[A] parent or
guardian... may not consent to have a child submit to painful and/or potentially life-threatening research procedures that hold no prospect of benefit for
the child and that may have the same result as a denial of necessary medical
treatment."131
This utilitarianism is not, however, foreign to the Code of Federal Regula132
tions.
128.
Id at § 46.405(a).
129.
This phenomenon is interestingly demonstrated by the law that has emerged to govern kidney
"donations" from the physically healthy but mentally retarded to their dying siblings. In each of these
cases, the healthy sibling had no prospect of any physical benefit from the transfer; if anything, he ran rather
considerable risks. The families largely succeeded, however, in convincing the courts to allow the donation
(the surgeons had refused to do so without obtaining judicial approval) by pointing to the psychological
benefit that the retarded children would derive from the survival of their siblings. See, for example, Little v
Little, 576 SW2d 493 (Tex 1979); Strunk v Strunk, 445 SW2d 145 (Ky 1969). See generally Glantz, Children as
Research Subjects at 106-10 (article cited in note 116).
130.
See Ross, 8 Stan L & Pol'y Rev at 166 (cited in note 120). See also Brock, Children as Research
Su6ects at 90 (article cited in note 119).
131.
T.D. v New York State Office ofMental Health, 228 AD2d 95, 124, 650 NYS2d 173, 192 (NY App
Div 1996). See also Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute, 366 Md 29, 131, 782 A2d 807, 858 (2001) ("a parent,
appropriate relative, or other applicable surrogate, cannot consent to the participation of a child or other
person under legal disability in nontherapeutic research or studies in which there is any risk of injury or
damage to the health of the subject").
132.
Two of the four risk categories are explicitly justified in Subpart D by utilitarian arguments. See
Appendix, Categories III & IV. The first permits the research if it is "likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the subjects' disorder or condition." Subpart D at § 46.406(c) (cited in note 5). The second
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3. Summary
When we consider what practical consequences will result when the current
research-expansion initiatives eventually confront the DHHS pediatric regulations, it will be important to keep in mind these rather considerable weaknesses.
In spite of the drafters' dear desire to protect children from investigatory overreaching by requiring parental consent, there is a tension in this mechanism that
will simply not go away. A parent's job, before all others, is to look out for his
child's interests. Though not evident at first glance, circumstances may arise in
which this can be done only with difficulty if the parent, as Judge Ross described
the situation, has no authority to subject a child to non-therapeutic but painful
33
research protocols.
One can, of course, try to slide by this tension in one of two ways. Most
baldly, one can ignore the problem and turn to the utilitarian justifications found
in Subpart D. With greater promise, one could work to redefine "benefit" to
encompass the pedagogic within the pediatric. The sure way of addressing the
problem, however, has been to discern "therapeutic" potential in any intervention.
A frightening illustration of the unfortunate consequences of the regulation's "therapeutic" exception can be found in the case of Dr. Leonard Bailey's
unsuccessful transplantation of a baboon's heart into "Baby Fae" in 1984.134
With no intervention from his IRB, Dr. Bailey performed an exceedingly risky
procedure that possessed, nonetheless, the possibility of conveying a great
therapeutic benefit: life. While one can question the propriety of this experiment
on the basis of its many legal and ethical lapses, not the least of which was Dr.
Bailey's failure to search for a newborn's heart for transplantation (one was available at the time), it is not at all clear that his risk/benefit calculation was erroneous. At bottom, so long as the researcher's experiment can clear this hurdle he is
home free.
B. OBTAINING "ASSENT" FROM CHILDREN
In addition to the requirement that a researcher obtain "permission" from
the parent(s) or guardian of a minor before enrolling him in a medical experiment, the DHHS rules also require that a researcher obtain the child's "assent"
to the intervention. While this requirement, as discussed above, can be qualified
or waived in a rather significant number of circumstances, the default rule is that
permits research if "the research presents a reasonable opportunity to further the understanding, prevention, or alleviation of a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of children." Id at § 46.407(a). And
one sort of research, that involving not "greater than minimal risk," requires no justification whatsoever. Id
at § 46.404.
See T.D., 228 AD2d at 124, 650 NYS2d at 192 (cited in note 131).
133.
134. See generally Glantz, Children as Research Subjects 126-27 (article cited in note 116).
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without this "assent," an investigatory intervention may not proceed. This requirement poses many interesting and practical questions: Do minors have a
legal right to consent, assent, or refuse to participate in experimentation? Is it
appropriate that we endow them with a power to do such? Does this right provide the child with any "additional protection" against investigatory overreaching?
A useful way to understand the "Common Rule" is to view it as an attempt
to balance the autonomy of the potential research subject (to assess the nature
of the risks he is willing to run) against our communal desire (to constrain the
scope of this individual choice to interventions that have a favorable benefit-risk
ratio) and then, but only then, allow the potential subject to assess and assume
the risks. The unusual nature of pediatric experimentation makes this already
complex balancing act even more problematic: The decision-making unit is not
one, but two or three. We have explored the complexities of this situation from
one point of view, the parent's ability to give "permission" for his child's involvement; let us now address it from the other, the child's ability to "assent" to
such.
The basic requirement of the pediatric regulations regarding the child's "assent" is that the researcher must obtain it before the child can participate in an
experiment. Subpart D provides, as discussed above, many circumstances under
which the IRB may waive this requirement, but fails-at least in the code itself-to provide these committees with firm guidance concerning the ages at
which the request for such a waiver might be regarded as suspect. The report
prepared by the National Commission does, however, seek to confront this
question more forthrightly. 135 The authors of this report recommended that an
IRB should consider the "assent" of a child over the age of seven to be mandatory, unless the "intervention holds out a prospect of direct benefit that is important to the health or well-being of the child at hand and is available only in
the context of the research."' 136 Infants need not "assent," nor should "assent"
be sought from incapacitated children of any age. 13 7
The Commission's observations place even more discretion in the hands of
the child. "The objection of a child of any age," the report declares, "to participation in research should be binding."'1 38 It allows, however, that objections of
small children may be overridden if the interventions are ones "from which the
subjects might derive significant benefit to their health or welfare" and enjoins
the researchers to take seriously the objections of school-aged children, recommending third-party dispute resolution should the child and parents be in disagreement. 139 As the Commission concludes, "[a]lthough parents may legally
135.

See National Commission, Retsearcb Involving Children at 12-17 (cited in note 26).

136.

Id at 12-13.

137.

Id at 16.

138.
139.

Id.
Id.
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override the objections of school-age children in such cases, the burden of that
decision becomes heavier in relation to the maturity of the particular child." 40

1. What Does the Law Have to Say?
The National Commission's observation that "parents may legally override
the objections of school-age children" begs the question as to what the law actually does have to say regarding the dispositive character of a child's wishes. The
initial answer to this question suggests that, whatever the National Commission
might wish, the actual regulators said that the question is to be decided according to the laws of the jurisdiction in which the researcher and patient happen to
find themselves. As the regulations declare: 'Children' are persons who have
not attained the legal age for consent to treatments or procedures involved in
the research, under the applicable law of the jurisdiction in which the research
141
will be conducted."'
The legal question can profitably be phrased in two complementary ways.
First, if the parents want their child to participate but the child does not, can the
parents force his participation? Second, if the child wants to participate, but the
parents do not want him to enroll, can they prevent such from occurring? The
answers to these two questions suggest that Subpart D's assent requirements (as
the National Commission suggested that they should be interpreted) are a bit
more indulgent toward the wishes of children than courts might be.
Helpful guidance concerning these questions can be found in the commonlaw development, over the past four decades, of the rules governing the ability
of minors to obtain medical treatment without parental consent. 142 As we have
discussed at length above, parents have traditionally enjoyed the right to make
most decisions concerning the medical care of their minor child, even over the
child's objections. 143 In the 1960s and early '70s many practicing physicians were
presented with a unique moral and legal challenge. With the advent of easy access to recreational drugs and contraception, teenagers suffering from the various physical consequences of the psychedelic and sexual revolutions frequently
asked physicians-on their own initiative-to treat their maladies. Because physicians who treat under-age patients expose themselves to civil battery suits,
doctors were forced to choose between their Hippocratic obligation to heal and
their legal duty to obtain parental consent before administering treatment. Many
potential patients were understandably loath to request parental authorization.
The consequence was the further development of several exceptions to the
140.
Id.
141.
Subpart D at § 46.402(a) (cited in note 5).
142.
See generally Walter Wadlington, Consent to Medical Cartfor Minors: The Legal Framework, in Gary
B. Melton et al, eds, Children'sCompetence to Consent 57 (Plenum 1983).
143.
See, for example, Robert W. Bennett, Allocation of Child Care DedsionmakingAuthoriy: A Suggested
InterestAnasis, 62 Va L Rev 285 (1976).
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general rule of parental control over medical decisions regarding their children.
One of these, the simplest, and least relevant for our purposes, was the general
lowering of the age of consent. 144 Another was the "emancipated minor" rule.
By engaging in certain "adult" activities-including marriage, motherhood, military service, and self-support-a minor acquired the right to consent to medical
treatment. 145 Exceptions were also crafted for the treatment of specific conditions, such as sexually transmitted diseases, drug addiction, and prenatal care. 146
Yet another was the further development of the "mature minor rule." Under the
strict patriarchal rule, a child--even a teenager days away from majority-was
legally incompetent. The "mature minor rule" changed this categorical exclusion
into a rebuttable presumption: Upon a showing of sufficient cognitive and emotional maturity, a minor could obtain the right to consent to medical treatment. 147 The most permissive response to this sort of problem is the development of the "rule of sevens." This rule holds that between birth and the age of
seven, a child cannot consent; from seven to fourteen a child was rebuttably
incapable of consenting; and from the age of fourteen until majority the pre48
sumption was one of capacity.1
This doctrinal evolution suggests that, while the law is still hesitant to grant
any purchase to the desires of a child under the age of seven, it is occasionally
willing to entertain those of children between seven and fourteen, and eager to
let those over fourteen act independently from their parents. On this reading, in
both of the strained situations described above-the child refusing to participate
and the child wanting to participate-the law would not be willing to sustain the
very young child's desires, but would be increasingly receptive as he matures.
Viewed from this perspective, the regulations' general desire to grant children a
decisive role receives some sustenance: The regulations push the envelope a bit
with respect to the seven-to-fourteen cohort (granting more autonomy than the
common law might), but are certainly within the purview of the "rule of sevens"

144.
See, for example, Wadlington, Childrrn's Competence to Consent 57 (cited in note 142).
145.
See, for example, Minn Stat Ann §§ 144.341-342 (2001).
146.
See Wadlington, Children's Competence to Consent at 61-62 (cited in note 142) ("Such 'condition
specific' consent provisions seem to reflect a policy of expedience on the part of legislatures that have
adopted them.... The statutes are directed toward problems that legislatures acknowledge as presenting
serious medical difficulties among minors; they abrogate the historical legal incapacity of minors to consent
to treatment for fear that if parental consent were required in the specifically enumerated instances many
adolescents would refrain from or delay treatment, to the detriment of themselves and their community.")
147.
See Younts v St. FrandsHosp., 205 Kan 292, 301, 469 P2d 330, 338 (1970) (holding that a seventeen-year-old girl "was mature enough to understand the nature of the consequences and to knowingly
consent to the beneficial surgical procedure").
148.
See, for example, Cardwellv Becbtol, 724 SW2d 739, 749 (Tenn 1987) ("[]t would rarely, if ever,
be reasonable, absent an applicable statutory exception, for a physician to treat a minor under seven years,
and... between the ages of seven and fourteen, the rebuttable presumption is that a minor would not have
the capacity to consent; moreover, while between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, a presumption of
capacity does arise, that presumption may be rebutted by evidence of incapacity, thereby exposing a physician or care provider to an action for battery.")
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with regard to those over the age of fourteen.
The various cases that have skirted about the issue of children's consent to
medical interventions suggest that, even as courts are willing to let minors make
many decisions concerning medical care, there exist important limitations on
this authority. First the base-line: It appears that the courts might well be comfortable with a child's participation in research not personally beneficial if it is
clear that both the parents and the child have given their consent. In this respect, the pediatric regulations' emphasis on dual consent would appear to be on
firm ground. It also appears that courts might consider parental consent to be
149
necessary, notwithstanding the child's expressed willingness to participate.
Once again, the pediatric regulations appear to comport well with the decided
cases. It does not appear, however, that courts would be so willing to treat the
child's objections as dispositive. A court might be willing to acknowledge the
refusal of a fifteen-year-old; it is not so obvious that it would treat an eight-yearold's refusal in the same way. The law appears to be willing to afford a great deal
of weight to the volition of a high-school student, but considerably less to that
of the schoolboy.
2. Does this Provision Provide "Additional Protections"?
Apart from the question concerning the extent to which the courts might
respect the system of dual consent found in the pediatric regulations, we should
certainly ask whether it is appropriate that a code purporting to provide a child
with "additional protections" give him the right to veto his parents' decision.
The answers provided by the ethicists can be found all over the map. William
Bartholome sets the standard quite low, arguing only that the child must consent
to the research performed on him; William Curran and Henry Beecher raise the
bar a bit, declaring that the child must be at least four years old before his assent
(or refusal) could be dispositive; and Terrence Ackerman sets it highest, arguing
that parents alone should decide, as the system of dual consent makes a mockery
150
of the parental duty to children.
One's response to this question likely turns upon an answer to two other
questions, one interpretive, the other empirical. First: Does this veto exist to
provide the child with "additional protections" or to provide him with a genuine
opportunity to make an autonomous moral decision? Second: Does the dualconsent regime actually provide the child with substantially greater protection
than he would enjoy under a more patriarchal approach?
As discussed already, the entire regulatory scheme can best be understood
149.
See Wadlington, Cbildren'sCompetence to Consent at 69 (cited in note 142).
150.
See Bartholome, Parents, Children,and the Moral Benefits of Research 44-45 (cited in note 124); Wilham J. Curran & Henry K. Beecher, Experimentation in Children:A Reexamination of Legal EthicalPnndples, 210
J Am Med Assn 77, 77-83 (1969); Ackerman, 27 Clinical Res (cited in note 124). See generally Ross, 8 Stan
L & Pol'y Rev at 160 (cited in note 120).
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as an attempt to balance our communal desire, on the one hand, to police the
researcher-subject relationship and our concern, on the other, that potential
subjects enjoy as much autonomy as possible. To ensure that the balance is appropriate, the regulations set up a series of relatively strong barriers followed by
an ultimate decisional firewall.
In the case of the rules governing research on autonomous adults, the intermediate barriers are rather weak and control over the firewall is granted to the
subject: Before the invitation makes its way to the subject, the principal investigator and the IRB need only screen out unnecessary risks and provide him with
detailed information concerning the nature and scope of the experiment. But it
is the research subject who must make the final decision regarding the proffered
request.
Ascertaining the location of the firewall in the pediatric regulations is a bit
more difficult. In research involving children, Subpart D places an additional
burden on the investigator and the IRB: The risk-minimization criteria are far
more stringent than those found in the general regulations. But the system of
dual consent makes it difficult to figure out where the firewall is: Do the parents
(in providing their "permission") serve this function or is it the child himself (in
granting "assent") who is meant to man the firewall?
This is not a trivial hermeneutical question, given that the moral legitimacy
of the "assent" provision turns on it. If we read the regulations as placing the
firewall with the parents, Subpart D escapes the opprobrium that one might
otherwise heap upon it. This reading proceeds thus: The code grants to parents
the right to make final critical decisions regarding medical experimentation with
the expectation that they will exercise this authority with something approaching
the exacting discretion we expect fiduciaries to exercise. The code's requirement
that researchers obtain the child's affirmative "assent" and its grant to the child
of the right to object should not be seen as another (even if supererogatory)
firewall, but, rather, as an indulgence dispensed to children to enable them to
exercise their moral agency freely and thereby mature into autonomous and
charitable adults. This argument is not textually implausible, as Subpart D very
rarely allows the IRB to waive parental "permission" requirements but makes it
quite easy for the IRB to waive the "assent" provision.
If, however, we read the "assent" requirements as placing the decisional
firewall in the child's control, it becomes considerably more doubtful that the
drafters of this code successfully executed Congress' mandate to provide child
subjects with additional protections. 15' The problem here should be readily apparent. These regulations were enacted because it was clear that children, who
are still developing their cognitive and moral faculties, are poorly situated to
resist invitations from either parents or doctors-those whom they have been
taught to trust-to participate in medical experimentation. Even if one were to
151.

See National Research Act at § 202(a)(2) (cited in note 7).
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conclude that Subpart D generally succeeds in its goal of protecting children by
preventing researchers from inviting them to participate in frivolous and/or
dangerous research, it fails to protect them to the extent that it actually endows
children with substantive decision-making authority.
On the assumption-shared by parents and child-that it is the child who is
manning the firewall, the parent, by the simple act of "allowing the child to decide for himself," has strongly influenced the child's decision, one way or
other. 152 Even teenagers (though they are loath to admit it) do look to their parents for guidance. If, on the other hand, the child does not know who is manning the firewall (or cannot possibly comprehend what it might mean to take
that decision-making burden on his own shoulders) a parent's well-intentioned

"Well, you were the one who said we shouldn't torce religion on them-that they'ci to it tor tmemselves." Ed Fisher, Ed Fisher'sFirstFolio 86 (MacjiUan 1955).
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buck-passing, seemingly encouraged by Subpart D, constitutes nothing short of
abandonment or betrayal.
One could argue, of course, in defense of Subpart D, that this dual consent
formulation does provide children with additional protection in that it sets up, in
addition to the base-line firewall (parental "permission"), yet another protection
in the form of the "assent" requirement: Even after parents guard against investigatory overreaching as diligently as they can, the "assent" requirement allows
children to narrow the range of acceptable experimentation even further. While
I do not doubt that this is a logical possibility, this dual consent regime also
comes with all the vices attendant on any system of governance that relies on
checks and balances, most notably the willingness to shrink from making diffi153
cult decisions in the hope that the other branch will make the right choice.
One can hope, nonetheless, that those parents who wish to enroll their children in biomedical research experiments will view the "assent" requirement as
pedagogic rather than decisive and thus be willing to scrutinize research protocols with the highest degree of care. We ought to be concerned, however, that
the presence of this "assent" requirement in Subpart D will enable-even invite-the parents of a prospective research subject to pass the buck on to their
children.
The "assent" feature of the pediatric regulations is a classic case of the double-edged sword. By giving children the right to "assent" and the power to "object," one of its blades surely cuts through the paternal power that has long
characterized the triangular relationship between researchers, children, and parents. This is no inconsiderable gain, particularly for children of mature age and
faculties. Cutting in the other direction, however, is the burden that this provision moves from parents to their children. While one might hope that parents
will diligently exercise the prerogatives of their remaining power to withhold
"permission," these regulations, as they stand, present the distinct possibilityboth in theory and in practice-that children must serve as the ultimate gatekeepers for regulations intended, first and foremost, to offer them protections
they have rarely enjoyed.

IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY
We can only conclude that the pediatric regulations fail to give affirmative
answers to the two questions we posed.

153.

See Charles L. Black, Stuture and Relationsbip in ConstitutionalLaw 70-71 (LSU 1969).
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1. The "Therapeutic Research" Exception
The distinction between "therapeutic research" and "non-therapeutic research" does not sufficiently protect child subjects. As the threshold question for
determining both the permissible level of risk ("Can the intervention entail a risk
that is 'greater than minimal"'?) and the magnitude of parental deliberation ("Do
both parents need to agree?"), this is a very important question indeed. It fails in
two ways. First, it is silent as to the nature of the required "benefit," opening up
the distinct possibility that a researcher could defend investigatory overreaching
with the invocation of the psychological benefit accruing to his subjects. Second,
such an intervention can transgress the otherwise applicable "minimal risk" limitation with great ease. To enroll a child in a highly risky experiment, all the researcher need argue is (1) that its therapeutic potential is at least as favorable as
the customary treatment and (2) that its potential benefit outweighs its risks.
Surely the possibility (even if remote) of one more year of life is worth six
months of nausea!

2. Proxy Consent
The proxy consent process does not serve as an adequate substitute for the
otherwise obligatory "voluntary informed consent." First, we have no settled
standard of judgment by which parent(s) can be guided and to which they
should be held. On the one hand, the use of "substituted judgment" allows parents perhaps too much discretion, as it is an empty vessel into which their selfcongratulatory expectations can be poured. On the other hand, the use of a
"best interests" standard-if such be taken to impose a fiduciary obligationmight well categorically prevent almost all pediatric testing. When a fiduciary
acts, he must do so for the exclusive benefit of his cestui que trust.More capacious
interpretations have been proffered, namely, in the best interests of the family
and the psychological development of the child, but these can suffer from abuse
similar to that suffered by the "substituted judgment" standard.
Second, it is entirely unclear how the child-"assent" requirement endows a
child subject with "additional protection." This provision is unproblematic if
one views the opportunity to decline to participate as an indulgence we dispense
to children to enable them to exercise their moral agency freely and thereby
mature into autonomous and charitable adults. One might then inquire, however, why this requirement can be so easily waived. If, on the other hand, one
views the "assent" provision as placing the decisional firewall in the child's control, it becomes quite dubious that child subjects have thereby been granted
"additional protection." This can be seen from two points of reference. As previously noted, there are far too many situations in which the IRB may allow the
researcher to "waive" the "assent" requirement. Also, we place in the hands of
children-whose moral faculties are still developing well into their teen-age
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years-responsibility for a decision that only mature and responsible adults can
reasonably make.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Definitional Clarity for Subpart D
Many of the problems I have identified in this Article could be ameliorated
by enhancing the definitional clarity of Subpart D.
To minimize abuse of the provision that allows "therapeutic" experiments
to present risks that are "greater than minimal," the regulations could be
amended in two ways. First, the standard demanding that the experiment "[hold]
out the prospect of direct benefit for the individual subject"1 54 could be revised
to mandate that the probability of such benefit be "more likely than not," or
some such formulation. Second, the regulations could be revised to exclude
categorically any experiments that propose-apropos the benefits accruing to
the research subject-to enhance ony the psychological "well-being" of the
155
child.
To give greater integrity to the current system of proxy consent, two
changes might be made: The first is easily effected; the other presents special
complexities. First, the "assent" provision should either be strengthened or
eliminated. I believe that the "assent" provision represents our abdication of
adult responsibility and ought accordingly be eliminated. Should an opposite
view prevail, Subpart D might properly be amended so as to give IRBs a considerably more limited discretion to "waive" the requirement that the child "assent." Second, a standard for parental "permission" could be established. What
do we rightly expect of parents? Should they exercise "substituted judgment,"
act in their children's "best interests," or act as "fiduciaries"? Narrowing the list
of options is easy enough: Allowing the imputation of substituted judgment
imposes no constraint; expecting fiduciary behavior forecloses experimentation
altogether. Lighting upon a more conventional "best-interests" standard does
little, however, to resolve the problem. Even if Subpart D were to declare explicitly that this standard ought to govern, it is hard to see what practical effect
that might have, as few of the other parties to this enterprise are ultimately interested in second-guessing parental decisions to proceed.

154.
155.

Subpart D at § 46.405 (cited in note 5).
Id.
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2. Protecting the Dignity of Child Research Subjects-Coping with
a Failure of "Informed Consent"
When Congress demanded in the early 1970s that "additional protections"
for children be included in the general regulations, the paramount concern was
that "vulnerable populations" were not adequately protected from over-eager
researchers. It was in those terms that it phrased this concern and in those terms
that the authors of the Belmont Report endeavored to guide the regulators at
the DHHS. When, however, the regulators finished their work, this paternalistic
concern had been significantly transmogrified. Instead of describing how children qua "vulnerable population" could be protected, it created an elaborate
system of proxy consent to compensate for the fact that children simply cannot
give legally binding consent for any sort of biomedical research.
Should Congress decide that it is interested in protecting children involved
in biomedical research-not just from the inevitable safety risks but also from
the equally inevitable assaults on human dignity-it should be willing to approach this problem in a slightly more radical way. Rather than look to "informed consent" or any of its offspring as a tool to protect the dignity of children, it ought to conjure up the spirit that inspired these regulations and seek to
heed its warning: The dignity of all people, adults and children alike, cannot be
protected by resort to "voluntary informed consent" alone. Any researcher who
proposes to experiment on children should be particularly aware of this fact and
do everything possible-from design to administration-to avoid perpetration
of an assault on human dignity. It wouldn't hurt if the law also reminded him of
that obligation.
CONCLUSION: ELUSIVE VALUES-SPEED, SAFETY, AND DIGNITY

The choice that Congress and the Executive will have to make-whether it
be to enforce the existing code more strictly, tighten up its definitions, eschew
proxy consent as a means for protecting children, or retreat from prior commitment to the "Pediatric Rule"-should not be easy. This is not because our
representatives will be tugged in several directions by diverse interest groups (as
they certainly will be), but, rather, because the fundamental interests at stake
simply are so patently divergent. On one hand is the interest that the presently
sick child (and society at large) has in the preservation of that child's dignity. On
the other is the health of the many children, similarly suffering, who have yet to
come. As Plato would say, these two interests are "incommensurable,"' 56 or, as
we would have it, "them's apples 'n' oranges."
It would certainly be easy to suggest that the answer be dictated by philosophical taste: Kant sides with the former, Bentham with the latter. de gustibus non
156.

Plato, Tbeaetetul 147d-148b (N.H. Fowler ed & trans, Loeb Classical 1923).
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disputanda.I wish to suggest, however, that the problem cannot be dismissed as a
matter of personal predilection. Choices will certainly be made-to respect
scrupulously societal notions of personal dignity, to seek the greatest good for
the greatest number, or (as is most likely) to strike a balance between the two.
But each of these choices comes at a price. The more we seek to protect the
dignity of a few currently suffering children, the less will we be able to treat
many more such children in the future. And vice-versa. A communal refusal to
subject children suffering from cancer to the many unpleasantries of chemotherapeutic trials necessarily retards the pace of development of therapies for
other such children.
Consider NASA's insistence that, in preparing for a landing of robot lunar
explorers in 1999, it could work-and was working-"faster, better, cheaper."
Sober reflection, after a series of disastrous failures, elicited the wry comment
that one could have any two of these good things at the same time, but not all
three. Is it perhaps so with the triad of pediatric research goals also: speed,
safety, and dignity? Surely, not all good things can be had simultaneously.
The euphoria occasioned by the remarkable biomedical discoveries of the
last several years is difficult to resist. 15 Many thoughtful people, including the
former Vice-President, have been caught up in it. In August 2000, Albert Gore,
Jr., committed himself to deliver the therapeutic benefits thereof to the American people: "Within the next few years, scientists will identify the genes that
cause every type of cancer .... We will find new medicines and new cures, not
158
just for cancer, but for everything from diabetes to H.I.V./AIDS [sic].)'
No considerate observer wants to be the skunk at the garden party, but in
any case in which widely held moral sensibilities are or might be offended, and
surely in any case in which human life and dignity is placed at risk, one must
157.
This enthusiasm is not limited to human health, as the following text from a pet food advertisement suggests:
"I wish my dog didn't scratch so much."
"I wish my cat didn't shed so much."
"I wish my dog would live until my kids are grown."
"I wish my older cat was more playful."
If You Ever Wished it for Your Pet, Purina Scientists Are Working on it Today. Over
70 years ago, when we began our study of pet nutrition, who would've dreamed our simple
mission would evolve into the study of nutritional genetics? Back then, no one knew it would
become possible to micro-design pet food based on our knowledge of genetics. Who would
have thought an adjustment to a pet food formula could minimize the risk of certain health
problems just by the way the nutrients interact with the genes? We now know, as we continue
our enthusiastic research into the mysteries of DNA, that the possibilities are virtually unlimited. The knowledge we've gained so far is already at work in Purina pet foods. Everything we
ever wished for our pets, we're working to make a reality, through the science of Purina.
PURINA. Redefining the Possible.
National Geographic, Oct 1998, at the last page of the unpaginated front matter, directly opposite the
message From the Editorat 1.
158.
Albert Gore, Jr., Acceptance speech at Democratic National Convention, Los Angeles, Aug
2000.
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ask-as a matter of societal claims and aspirations: What price progress?
In times and circumstances such as ours, it is easy to forget a lesson we all
know: Choices have consequences, many of which are unwanted. A powerful
reminder of this fact was beautifully articulated by Hans Jonas in 1969, on the
eve of this regulatory revolution. Possessed of a subtle understanding of the
practical consequences of German idealism, Jonas reminded us of the tangible
cost that future generations would have to pay for his generation's solicitude
toward the dignity interests of the patient at hand:
Let us not forget that progress is an optional goal, not an unconditional
commitment, and that its tempo in particular, compulsive as it may become, has
nothing sacred about it. Let us also remember that a slower progress in the conquest of disease would not threaten society, grievous as it is to those who have
to deplore that their particular disease be not yet conquered, but that society
would indeed be threatened by the erosion of those moral values whose loss,
possibly caused by too ruthless a pursuit of scientific progress, would make its
159
most dazzling triumphs not worth having.
Whatever we mean to accomplish with the next generation of medical research, we should not ignore the fact that the benefits desired do not come
without a price.

159.
(1969).

Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98 Daedalus 219, 245
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